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I. INTRODUCTION: THE EFFECT OF DECISIONMAKING STYLE ON
THE TREATMENT OF PRECEDENT

During our nation's history, Supreme Court decisionmaking has evidenced four different styles: formal, Holmesian,
instrumental and natural law.' One or the other of these
styles has predominated during various eras. Initially, from
1789 to 1872, the Court predominantly followed a natural law
decisionmaking style.2 From 1872 to 1937, the Court predominantly followed a formalist style; from 1937 to 1954, a

A full discussion of the four decisionmaking styles appears in R. Randall
Kelso, Separation of Powers Doctrine on the Modem Supreme Court and Four
Doctrinal Approaches to Judicial Decision-Making, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 531 (1993)
[hereinafter Kelso, Separation of Powers]. A discussion of the styles in the specific
context of constitutional law adjudication appears in R. Randall Kelso, Styles of
Constitutional Interpretationand the Four Main Approaches to Constitutional Interpretation in American Legal History, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 121 (1994) [hereinafter
Kelso, Styles]. An application of this analysis to criticism of recent constitutional
decisions as unprincipled innovations appears in Charles D. Kelso & R. Randall
Kelso, Our Nine Tribunes: A Review of Professor Lusky's Call for Judicial Restraint, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1289 (1995) [hereinafter Kelso & Kelso, Nine
Tribunes]. For further discussion of the four decisionmaking styles in the context
of common law, statutory and constitutional adjudication, see R. RANDALL KELSO
& CHARLES D. KELSO, STUDYING LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 101-23, 261-310, 388-423
1

(1984).
2 See generally Kelso, Styles, supra note 1, at 150-84.
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Holmesian style; and from 1954 to 1986, an instrumental
3 Today, a modern natural law style appears to be emergstyle.
4
ing.
In previous articles, we have discussed how these four
judicial decisionmaldng styles differ as they affect arguments
addressed to constitutional text and purpose, constitutional
structure, history surrounding adoption of constitutional provisions, legislative and executive action under constitutional
provisions, and the social consequences of adopting a particular
course of action.5 As might be expected, considerable variation
also exists in constitutional interpretation with respect to the
weight given precedent. These variations are explored in this
Article, with a special focus on how today's post-instrumental
Court has been dealing with instrumental-era precedents.
During the instrumental era-particularly during the
years of the Warren Court (1953-69)--the Court creatively
engaged in overruling or limiting many precedents and in
creating many new rules, primarily to recognize new civil
rights and otherwise to provide additional protections against
government action. One might expect that the post-instrumental Court of today, a far more conservative institution, would
conclude that a number of these instrumental cases were
wrongly decided. As a result, the post-instrumental Court
would engage in a substantial retraction of those precedents by
way of overruling or limiting their impact. There has not, in
fact, been a flood of such decisions. Perhaps the principal reason for this is that the modern natural law style of
decisionmadng employed by many Justices on the Court today
is associated with views on stare decisis that include numerous
restraints on departing from precedent. Naturally, any attorney wishing to persuade a majority of the Supreme Court to

' Kelso, Styles, supra note 1, at 184-225.
' See generally Kelso, Styles, supra note 1, at 167-84, 227-28; Kelso & Kelso,
Nine Tribunes, supra note 1, at 1306-23.
1 For discussion of how each of these factors affects constitutional interpretation generally, see Kelso, Styles, supra note 1; Kelso & Kelso, Nine Tribunes, supra note 1. For discussion of these factors in two specific constitutional contexts,

see Kelso, Separation of Powers, supra note 1; Charles D. Kelso & I. Randall
Kelso, Standing to Sue: Transformations in Supreme Court MethodooVy, Doctrine
and Results, 28 U. TOL L. REV. (forthcoming 1996) [hereinafter Kelso & Kelso,

Standing to Sue].
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adopt a particular view, or any attorney merely wishing to
predict the outcome of a Supreme Court decision, must take
into account the Justices' approaches toward stare decisis.6
This Article identifies the Justices' various views and restraints regarding departing from, or following, precedent. We
then illustrate how these restraints are currently operating in
practice, though we make no claim to undertake an exhaustive
analysis of all recent cases. To preface this analysis, we begin
by describing the four decisionmaking styles and how each one
treats precedent.
A. The Four Styles: Formal, Holmesian, Instrumental and
Natural Law
The decisionmaking style of a judge depends in large part
on how the judge perceives two critical variables: the nature of
judicial responsibility and the nature of law.7 Regarding judicial responsibility, a judge can attempt to produce decisions
and opinions that are "good law" in the narrow sense of being
clear, certain, predictable, and unquestionably within the legitimate power of the court. Such judges typically are described
as following a "positivist" approach to judicial decisionmaking.8 In contrast, a judge could aim at producing law and applications of law that accord with certain moral principles
embedded in society's legal and moral culture. Those who
adopt this "normative" perspective give relatively more weight
than do positivist judges to the moral insights and traditions
which lie behind legal rules and which may develop over time.'

6

See generally Jeffrey Toobin, Supreme Sacrifice: Laurence Tribe May Never

Be on the Supreme Court, But Then He Doesn't Really Need To Be, NEW YORKER,
July 8, 1996, at 44 ("For his entire career, Tribe has studied the ideological predi-

lections of the Justices, and, with dispassionate, almost cynical detachment, he designs his arguments to appeal to a majority. His briefs consist of messages aimed
at those Justices whose votes he needs.").
' The following paragraphs in this section are heavily based upon a similar
summary of the four decisionmaking styles which appears in Kelso & Kelso,
Standing to Sue, supra note 5.
8 See generally H.LA. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,
71 HARv. L. REV. 593 (1958).
' See generally Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to
Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958). A more complete treatment of this
positivist/normative distinction appears in Kelso, Separation of Powers, supra note
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The nature of law can be seen as a set of rules and principles whose application by courts is guided by an analytic meth-

odology of logic and reason."0 In contrast, a judge can view
law as the means to achieve certain goals through a pragmatic
or functional treatment of rules and principles." Combining
these two views on the nature of judicial responsibility with
the two views on the nature of law results in there being four
decisionmnadng styles. They are explained below.
1. Formal
There are "analytic positivist" judges who blend an insistence on logical or mechanical rule application with a focus on
certain, predictable treatment of existing positive law. Such
judges, who may be called formalists,' 2 decide cases in accord
with an underlying assumption that law is not the same thing
as morality and that courts should produce law that is clear,
certain and predictable. They give relatively little weight to
whether a result is "just"in some moral sense. Instead, formalist judges view law as a set of rules and principles whose application by courts should be guided by an analytic methodology of logic and reason. 3 When interpreting the Constitution,
formalists give great weight to the literal meaning of terms
and to evidence of the specific intent of the Framers and Ratifiers regarding a particular constitutional provision. They give
much less consideration to searching for the purpose behind
the terms used or indications of any general intent the Fram1, at 535-38.
10

See generally Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Ratio-

nality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949 (1988).

n See generally Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, 35 COLUM L. REV. 809 (1935); see also Robert S. Summers, Pragmatic

Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century American Legal Tlught-A Synthesis and
Critique of Our Dominant General Theory About Law and Its Use, 66 CORNELL L

REV. 861 (1981). Fuller treatment of this analytic/functional distinction appears in
Kelso, Separation of Powers, supra note 1, at 536-38.
12 These judges have generally been called "formalists" because they concentrate
on the formal aspects of law--technical rule manipulation in light of the words in
a statute or constitution, and the narrow holdings of judicial precedents. They
have also been called "conceptualists See generally GRANT GILAoRE, THE AGES OF
AEICAN LAw 11-12 (1977).
1 For a fuller description of formalism, see Kelso, Separation of Powers, supra

note 1, at 532-38, and sources cited therein.
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ers may have had in mind. 4 The reason for this focus is that
literal meaning and specific intent are thought best to reflect a
certain, predictable and unbiased approach to the positive law
adopted by the Framers and Ratifiers. 5 Because of their concern with certainty and predictability, formalist judges prefer
that doctrine be stated in terms of clear, bight-line rules. 6
This "formalist" style of deciding can be observed in the work
of the Supreme Court and other American courts from approximately 1872 to approximately 1937.17 The formalist style is
well used today by Justices Scalia and Thomas. 8
2. Holmesian
A second kind of judicial decisionmaking style is a "functional positivist" approach, combining a view that legal rules
are always means to some ends with an emphasis on certain,
predictable treatment of existing positive law. The focus on

" See generally R. Randall Kelso, The Natural Law Tradition on the Modern
Supreme Court: Not Burke, but the Enlightenment Tradition Represented by Locke,
Madison, and Marshall, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1051, 1058-60 (1995) [hereinafter
Kelso, Natural Law Tradition]; Kelso & Kelso, Nine Tribunes, supra note 1, at
1301-02; see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127-28 n.6 (1989) (Scalia,
J.) (in determining the meaning of liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment, judges should consider only legislative enactments at "the most specific level at which
[the] relevant tradition" can be identified). For discussion of the differenices between specific and general intent, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Co.
herence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1198-99
(1987) ("Specific .intent involves the relatively precise intent of the framers to control the outcomes of particular types of cases .... Abstract [or general] intent
refers to aims that are defined at a higher level of generality, sometimes entailing
consequences that the drafters did not specifically consider and that they might
even have disapproved. An example comes from equal protection jurisprudence.
The authors of the fourteenth amendment apparently did not specifically intend to
abolish segregation in the public schools. Yet they did intend generally to establish
a regime in which whites and blacks received equal protection of the laws-an
aspiration that can be conceived, abstractly, as reaching far more broadly than the
framers themselves specifically had intended.") (footnotes omitted).
See generally Kelso, Styles, supra note 1, at 184-87.
See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1175 (1989). Thus, formalist judges typically reject legal doctrine which calls
for a balancing of factors or consideration of the 'totality of the circumstances." Id.
at 1184-87.
7 See generally Kelso, Styles, supra note 1, at 184-95, and sources cited therein.
Is Kelso, Styles, supra note 1, at 186-95, and sources cited therein; see Kelso,
Separation of Powers, supra note 1, at 587-88, 597-98.
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certain, predictable rules means that Holmesians tend to prefer rules with fairly sharp corners rather than "balancing"
tests.' Since legal rules are always viewed as means to ends,
however, purely logical or mechanical treatment of existing law
will not be sufficient to carry out the purposes behind legal
rules. Judges who adopt this view may be called "Holmesian,"
after Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, whose famous statement
reminds us that "[tihe life of the law has not been logic: it has
been experience. " ' As pragmatic functionalists, Holmesian
judges are sensitive to the purposes behind relevant legal
texts, and any general intent the Framers may have had in
mind when adopting those texts, in order to interpret the texts
in a way best calculated to achieve their intended goals. 2 As
positivists, however, Holmesian judges believe that the judicial
task is merely to interpret existing law, with changes in the
law coming primarily from the legislative or executive
branch.'
This approach towards law has meant that Holmesian
judges, more than any other kind of judge, tend to defer to the
government in constitutional cases unless the unconstitutionality of governmental action is clear.' This deferential approach also means that Holmesian judges are quite sensitive to
later legislative and executive action, which they may accept
as a "gloss" on the meaning of the Constitution. 4

,"See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 U.C.L.A. L REV. 379, 37980 (1985) (discussing Holmes's preference for the rigid rule of stop and look for
drivers coming to unguarded railroad crossings, rather than a more flexible balancing test focused on whether the driver has exercised reasonable caution).
" OLIVER WENDELL HOLMIES, THE CoMMON LAV 1 (1881).
See Kelso, Styles, supra note 1, at 196-99.
2 Kelso, Styles, supra note 1, at 199-200; see HOLMES, supra note 19, at 36
("The first requirement of a sound body of law is, that it should correspond with
the actual feelings and demands of the community, whether right or wrong.7).
23 On this strong view of judicial deference to the political process implicit in
the Holmesian approach, see Kelso, Styles, supra note 1, at 133-34, 167, 197, 20001 (discussing the views concerning judicial restraint of Thayer, Justices Holmes
and Frankfurter, and Professor Alexander Bickel, which typify this approach); see
also MICHAEL PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS? 86-90
(1994) (discussing James Bradley Thayer's "minimalist" approach towards constitutional interpretation and its embrace by Justices Holmes and Frankfurter, among
others).
24 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11
(1952) (Frankfinter, J., concurring) ("[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice,
long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, en-
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Holmes's views on the law and the role of courts had a
strong following on the Supreme Court between the years 1937
and 1954. They are shared most strongly on the Court today
by Chief Justice Rehnquist.'
3. Instrumental
At the opposite extreme from formalists are judges who
reject both the analytic and positivist aspects of formalism.
These judges see law in functional terms as a means serving
an end, and they reject a positivist approach to law in favor of
an approach that places the judge more on center stage by ensuring that the law advances proper moral concepts.26 Such
judges can be called "instrumentalists" because they see the judicial role primarily as an instrument to achieve justice in
society. Though agreeing with Holmesian judges that a functional, pragmatic or purposive approach towards rules is appropriate, instrumentalist judges are less willing to defer to
legislative decisions than are the Holmesians because instrumentalists reject positivism in favor of a normative concern
with the ultimate morality of legal decisions. Instrumentalist judges tend to create balancing tests rather than narrow
rules because balancing tests give courts the flexibility to do
justice in light of the facts of individual cases.28

gaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making
as it were such exercise of power part of the structure of our government, may be
treated as a gloss on 'executive Power' vested in the President . . . ."). In contrast
to this approach, a rigid formalist approach would reject reliance on such later
legislative and executive action on the grounds that such action is not directly
related to the literal text adopted by the Framers and Ratifiers or to the Framers'
and Ratifiers' specific intent. See generally Kelso, Styles, supra note 1, at 186.
However, in practice, most formalist judges will permit a continued and consistent
legislative or executive practice which indicates a clear tradition on a specific issue
to provide some gloss on meaning. For example, Justice Scalia is willing to permit
a tradition of legislative enactments at "the most specific level at which [the] relevant tradition" can be identified to help determine the meaning of liberty under
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Kelso, Styles, supra note 1, at 186-87 (citing,
inter alia, Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127-28 n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J.)).
I See generally Kelso, Separation of Powers, supra note 1, at 583-85, 601
n.266; Kelso, Styles, supra note 1, at 208-13, and sources cited therein.
26 See generally Kelso, Separation of Powers, supra note 1, at 532-38, and
sources cited therein.
Kelso, Separation of Powers, supra note 1, at 534, 537-38, 542-43.
26 See generally Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Paradox of Balancing Significant
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The instrumental style of decisionmaking prevailed on the
Supreme Court, beginning around 1954, the year Brown v.
Board of Education was decided.' By 1965, Chief Justice
Warren was serving on the Court with four like-minded instrumentalists (Justices Douglas, Brennan, Marshall and
Fortas)." The instrumental majority made vast changes in
rules of criminal justice and recognized many new civil rights,
particularly in the realm of privacy and equal protection."
However, the retirement of Chief Justice Warren and Justice
Fortas in 1969 changed the balance of power on the Court. By
1976, obly four instrumentalists served on the Court (Justices
Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall and Stevens).' To carry the
day they had to attract one of the three Hohnesians (Justices
Rehnquist, Stewart or White) or the lone formalist on the
Court (Chief Justice Burger), or the lone adherent to a modern
natural law style (Justice Powell).' With the recent retirement from the Court of Justices Brennan, Marshall and
Blackmun, the only instrumentalist on the Court today is Justice Stevens, and his views are moderate when compared to
the active instrumentalism of Justices Warren, Douglas,
Brennan, Marshall and Fortas.

Interests, 45 HASTINGS L. REV. 825 (1994); Kathleen I. Sullivan, Post.Liberal
Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293
(1992).
9 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For a similar overview which tracks these same eras of
constitutional history, see DANIEL FARBER FT AL., CONSTiTUTIONAL LAiW: THEES
FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S THIRD CENTURY 15-19 (1993) (describing the formalist
Lochner era from 1873-1937); id. at 19-23 (discussing the New Deal Court up to
the Warren Court); id. at 23-27 (discussing Brown, the Warren Court and beyond,
1953-present).
3 See LAURENCE TRIBE, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1722 (2d ed. 1988).
Justice Black, who basically followed a formalist judicial decisionmaking style, see
Kelso, Styles, supra note 1, at 186 n.297, often voted with the instrumental group
on civil rights and first amendment issues, giving the Court during the 19603 a
reasonably predictable instrumentalist majority for its decisions.
" Examples include Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (use of contraceptives by unmarried persons); Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (required warning prior to police questioning of an
accused); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (use of contraceptive3 by
married persons); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclude from criminal trials
evidence illegally seized).
See generally Kelso, Separation of Powers, supra note 1, at 581-82, 598-99,
602; Kelso, Styles, supra note 1, at 213-25.
"For discussion of the decisionmaking styles of these Justice3, see Kelso, Separationof Powers, supra note 1, at 602 n.266, and sources cited therein.
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4. Natural Law
A fourth group of judges adopt an "analytic, normative"
approach towards law. Such judges view law as a set of principles implemented through logic and reason, as do formalists,
but, like instrumentalists, evaluate law in terms of how it
advances moral concepts. These are the judges in the natural
law tradition. 4 While certain versions of natural law may be
as willing as instrumentalism to impose moral notions on contemporary constitutional decisionmaking,"5 our natural law
tradition (as espoused by Chief Justice John Marshall, Joseph
Story and James Madison, for example), holds that judges
should elaborate, in a reasoned fashion, the moral notions
placed into the Constitution by the Framers and Ratifiers."
This theory flows from viewing the natural law philosophy of
the Framers and Ratifiers as primarily influenced by Enlightenment natural law and the Enlightenment's "social contract"
theory of the nature of our government. The proper role of the
judiciary in such a society is to follow the "social contract" as
set out in a written Constitution.37 Because such judges operate out of the natural law respect for reasoned elaboration of
the law over time, natural law judges are more respectful of
later legislative and executive action as creating a "gloss" on
the meaning of the Constitution than are judges in any of the
other judicial decisionmaking traditions.3 8 The natural law
approach, grounded in traditional common-law principles, also
has a great commitment to "deciding cases on narrow grounds
when possible, deciding most cases only after full briefing and
argument, applying the method of analogical reasoning where

" On natural law generally, see Kelso & Kelso, supra note 1, at 115-19, 51421; Kelso, Separation of Powers, supra note 1, at 546-53. On a natural law approach to constitutional interpretation, see Kelso, Styles, supra note 1, at 150-84.
" See Kelso, Styles, supra note 1, at 159 (citing, inter alia, Mortimer Adler,
Robert Bork: The Lessons to Be Learned, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 1121 (1990)). A wellknown rejection of this approach appears in LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS
73 (1958) ("For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic
Guardians, even if I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do not.").
" See Kelso, Styles, supra note 1, at 160-63.
See Kelso, Natural Law Tradition, supra note 14, at 1067-73.
" See Kelso, Styles, supra note 1, at 157-59.
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appropriate, respecting the role of the courts in our constitu-

tional system, reasoned elaboration of the law, and other elements of sound judicial craftsmanship.'
The original natural law era extended from 1789 until
about 1872.' It appears to have been revived on the Court
today by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and
Breyer.4 Thus, it may represent a majority approach towards
judicial decisionmaking on the Supreme Court-even though,
of course, the Justices may disagree on certain particulars.42
B. How Each Style Treats Precedent
Because each style is grounded in the Anglo-American
common law system, the starting point for all four has been
the doctrine of stare decisis-follow precedent unless there is a
good reason to depart from it. In view of this doctrine, it is not
surprising that most of the time the Supreme Court follows
precedent when deciding a new case. This means that the
precedent is perceived to state or imply some rule of law as its
major premise, and the current case, after stating that rule
(and citing the precedent as authority), proceeds to characterize the current facts in terms of the rule and apply the rule to
the facts.' There is, however, considerable variation from one
style to the next with respect to how prior cases are treated.
Four variables account for most of the difference.
Kelso & Kelso, Nine Tribunes, supra note 1, at 1311-13, and sources cited
therein.
"See Kelso, Styles, supra note 1, at 150-67; FARBER ET AL, supra note 31, at
1-15 (describing the pre-Lochner era from 1787-1873).
" See generally Kelso, Natural Law Tradition, supra note 14, at 1080-85;
Kelso, Separation of Powers, supra note 1, at 587-96, 602 n.266; Kelso, Styles,
supra note 1, at 169-84, 227 n.604.
"2Such disagreement may be the result of a slight difference in interpretation
style among these predominantly natural law Justices, with Justice Kennedy leaning slightly in a formalist direction, Justice O'Connor leaning slightly in a
Holmesian direction, and Justices Ginsburg and Breyer leaning slightly in an instrmnental direction. See generally Kelso, Natural Law Tradition, supra note 14,
at 1082 n.106; Kelso, Separation of Powers, supra note 1, at 600-07; Kelso, Styles,
supra note 1, at 227 n.604. Or it may be the result of specific case bias, discussed
infra note 44. Or it may simply be the result of the Justices having different
perceptions relating to what the facts really are in the case before the Court.
See generally Harry W. Jones, Our Uncommon Common Law, 42 TEN . L.
REV. 443, 449 (1975) (=Sensitivity to the factual similarities, and dissimilarities, in
cases is, I suppose, the most striking characteristic of the common-law mind.").
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The first significant variable affecting the treatment of a
precedent is a judge's views on whether the precedent is rightly or wrongly decided. Because formalist, Holmesian, natural
law and instrumentalist judges approach questions of constitutional interpretation differently, they often reach different
conclusions about the extent to which some earlier precedent
was rightly or wrongly decided. This general interpretive bias
naturally affects whether the judge thinks certain precedents
are rightly or wrongly decided, and thus whether there is reason on the merits for the precedent to be followed, extended,
narrowed or overruled.44 As discussed below, this consideration, without further tests or conditions, carries the greatest
weight for instrumental judges.45
The second significant variable affecting the treatment of
precedent is how much weight a judge will give to whether the
precedent has become an integral part of subsequent case law
(i.e., whether the principle of the case has become "settled
law"). Formalist and natural law judges, whose analytic approach to law makes highly relevant the logical elaboration of
doctrine, tend to weigh heavily in their consideration of a precedent the extent to which it appears to represent "settled
law." 6 Holmesians, because they take a positivist approach to

" A more complete discussion of the phenomenon of general interpretive bias
appears in Kelso, Styles, supra note 1, at 149-50. Some specific examples of general interpretive bias appear in this Article infra notes 56-61 and accompanying
text.
A phenomenon related to general interpretive bias, which occasionally affects
how a judge treats precedent, is specific case bias. See generally Kelso, Styles,
supra note 1, at 149-50. One aspect of specific case bias is doctrinal bias. This
refers to the fact that some judicial decisionmaking appears to be influenced by
strongly held views that the judge holds on certain topics, such as freedom of
speech or the establishment of religion. In these areas, the judge may depart from
the judge's usual approach to judicial interpretation in order to reach a desired
result. Unusual pairings of Justices sometimes can best be explained in terms of
specific doctrinal case bias. See Kelso, Styles, supra note 1, at 149-50. A second
aspect of specific case bias is party bias. This refers to the fact that in some cases
a judge may prefer a particular party, or that party's lawyer, as opposed to the
other party, or that party's lawyer. Such personal bias is naturally inappropriate
for the judge to consider, and rules regarding judicial recusal are meant to prevent such bias from affecting case resolution. Nonetheless, such party bias may
occasionally affect the result in a particular case. See Kelso, Styles, supra note 1,
at 149-50.
See infra text accompanying notes 55-66.
' See infra text accompanying notes 67-82. Formalist and natural law judges
differ, of course, on another aspect of precedent. Because of their focus on mechan-
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the law and are concerned with certainty and predictability,
also evidence a willingness to follow even an instrumental
precedent with which they disagree if they view that precedent
as representing settled law.47
A third main variable in the treatment of precedent is the
extent to which individuals have substantially relied upon a
precedent as a means to advance important ends in their lives.
Because of their focus on a functional understanding of rules
as a means to individuals' and society's ends ' s Holnesian
judges tend to weigh this variable very heavily in their consideration of precedent.49 Since this third variable is also linked
to certainty and predictability in the law, as well as traditional
notions of equity and protecting individuals' reasonable reliance, it is also given significant weight by formalist and natural law judges."
The fourth main variable in how judges treat precedent
concerns their views on the traditional common-law commitment to reasoned elaboration of the law and respect for the
work product of previous judges.5 Judges who believe very
strongly in this traditional common-law commitment may
choose to follow precedents they believe are wrongly decided
even if those precedents do not represent settled law and there
has been no substantial reliance upon them. Instead, under
ical rulemaking based upon following the literal holdings in prior specific cases,
see supra text accompanying notes 12-16, formalist judges tend to approach the
interpretation of judicial precedents in light of their particular specific facts. In
contrast, natural law judges are more likely to see in precedents an embodiment
of explicit or implicit principles which courts can use as a foundation for doctrinal
development. See generally supra text accompanying notes 34-39 (discussing the
natural law approach towards viewing law as a set of principles capable of reasoned elaboration). Thus, formalist judges generally follow the narrow rulings of
precedent, while natural law judges are more willing to extend precedents in light
of a general principle found therein.
,I See generally Kelso, Styles, supra note 1, at 138 nn.72-73, 184-85, 195-96.
Thus, formalist judges, such as Justices Scalia and Thomas, and Holmesian Justices, such as Chief Justice Rehnquist, have been willing to follow an instrumentalist
precedent with which they disagree if they view that precedent as representing
settled law. Examples of this phenomenon are discussed infr text accompanying
notes 67-92.
See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
See generally infra text accompanying notes 84-92.
See generally infra text accompanying notes 84-92.
51

See generally RUPERT CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW (3d ed. 1977);

Charles Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law: Or What Lauyers Know, 60 TEX.
L. REV. 35, 54-58 (1981).
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this approach to precedent, one or more additional factors are
needed before the court should depart from a prior judicial
opinion.12 The judges who most often have this stronger commitment to precedent are judges in the natural law tradition.5" On the current Supreme Court, this includes Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer.'

II. STYLE-RELATED GUIDES FOR OVERRULING OR NARROWING
PRECEDENTS

A. The Instrumental Focus: Was a Precedent Wrongly Decided?
The most dramatic relationship between a current opinion
and a prior case occurs when the court either: (1) explicitly
overrules the precedent; or (2) sub silentio, simply does not
follow the precedent. Of course, if a precedent was itself a
departure from prior case law, it is more vulnerable to being
overruled.55
Judges who follow different styles of decisionmaking naturally disagree about whether certain precedents are rightly or
wrongly decided. The correctness of Roe v. Wade presents an
obvious example of style related disagreement. 6 Disagree2 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
864 (1992) ("[A] decision to overrule should result on some special reason over and
above a belief that a prior case was wrongly decided."). A list of these "special
reasons" to overrule precedent is discussed infra text accompanying note 93.
See generally Kelso & Kelso, Nine Tribunes, supra note 1, at 1321-23; Kelso,
Styles, supra note 1, at 139-40, 157-59. The natural law approach's great respect
for many aspects of the traditional common-law methodology, in addition to the
natural law's great respect for precedent, is noted supra text accompanying note
39.
" See generally Kelso, Separation of Powers, supra note 1, at 587-97, 602 &
n.266; Kelso, Styles, supra note 1, at 227 & n.604.
55 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2116 (1995),
overruling Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) ("Metro Broadcasting itself departed from our prior cases . . . ."). As a less extreme option to overruling a case, sometimes new facts will lead a Court to distinguish a precedent by
narrowing it to its facts or bypassing an opportunity to extend the case by applying its principle to a new fact situation which potentially could be seen as analogous. Distinguishing a case or even passing up an opportunity to extend the case
has the practical effect of narrowing its scope as a precedent. A similar result
occurs if the Court sets about characterizing the facts of a new case in an unusual way so as to avoid the application of a precedent, or slightly altering the statement of a rule so the precedent is qualified and, thus, narrowed in its application.
" A formalist approach to Roe would focus on literal constitutional text, and
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ment on the constitutionality of school prayer in Lee v.
Weisman provides another example." In some instances a for-

the specific intent of the Framers and Ratifiers regarding abortion, and specific
traditions regarding abortion since 1868. This formalist approach is best represented by Justice Scalia's dissent in Casey. See generally Kelso, Styles, supra note 1,
at 193-94. A Holmesian approach would add to this inquiry a focus on legislative
and executive traditions as part of the Holmesian deference to other branches of
government. This approach is represented by Justice Rehnquist's dissents in Roe
and Casey. Kelso, Styles, supra note 1, at 210-11. A natural law approach to Roe
would add to the Holmesian analysis a broader inquiry into what the concept of
"liberty" means in the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly, in our natural law
tradition, the concept of liberty from an Enlightenment natural law perspective.
From that perspective, Roe is not clearly wrong because, as noted by the joint
opinion in Casey of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter, "At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life." 505 U.S. at 85L The natural law commitment to precedent, see supra text accompanying notes 51-54, also counseled in
Casey that the core holding of Roe should not be overruled. 505 U.S. at 861, 869;
see generally Kelso, Styles, supra note 1, at 179-82. The instrumentalist approach,
after considering these factors, would also add consideration of the unfortunate
public policy consequences of not finding such a right. See generally Kelso, Styles,
supra note 1, at 223-24.
Because of the instrumentalist willingness to engage in social policy calculations, at least where leeway exists in the law, it is not surprising that the instrumentalist approach to Roe counsels strict scrutiny for every kind of burden on
reproductive rights, permitting the Court to police very carefully a whole range of
legislative regulations of abortion, including provisions regarding informed consent,
waiting periods and reporting requirements. See, eg., Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986). In contrast, the
natural law approach, which rejects such social policy argumentation in constitutional interpretation, reserved strict scrutiny in Casey for "undue burdens7 on
abortion rights. 505 U.S. at 876. Thus, the natural law approach protects the core
right of choice regarding abortion, while removing the courts from the role of dayto-day strict supervision of regular legislation.
57 505 U.S. 577 (1992). As in Roe, a formalist approach to Lee would focus on
literal constitutional text and the specific intent of the Framers and Ratifiers regarding prayer in schools. A Holmesian approach to Lee would add a slightly
broader inquiry into the Framers' purposes in enacting the Establishment Clause,
but would focus on legislative and executive traditions as part of the Holmesin
deference to other branches of government. From both perspectives, prayer in
schools should be constitutional. See id. at 631 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., White, J., and Thomas, J.). A natural law approach would ask
what the Framers' concept of "no establishment of religion! means, particularly
from an Enlightenment natural law perspective. From that perspective, as reflected
in the American context by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, Lee is properly
decided. See generally Kelso, Natural Law Tradition, supra note 14, at 1084-85.
The instrumentalist approach would build on this analysis also to consider the
social policy consequences of a decision either way. From the liberal instrumentalist perspective of Justices Brennan and Marshall, a strict separation of church and
state is good social policy, and thus establishment clause law should be applied to
enforce such a strict separation. On this issue, see generally Kelso, Natural Law
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malist judge's opinion will stand alone, as in the independent
prosecutor case, Morrison v. Olson.5" Other times, instrumentalist judges may stand alone, as in Bowers v. Hardwick.9
And even when judges agree about the result in a case, different decisionmaking styles may lead them to disagree about the
rule laid down to justify the result, as in the substantive due
process case of Michael H. v. Gerald D., ° or the minimum
contacts case of Burnham v. Superior Court.6

Tradition, supra note 14, at 1084-85; Kelso, Styles, supra note 1, at 178-79, 19394, 209-10, 223.
ra 487 U.S. 654 (1988); see generally Kelso, Separation of Powers, supra note 1,
at 621-26 (discussing Justice Scalia's formalist strict separation of powers approach
and its rejection by Homesian, natural law and instrumentalist judges, in favor of
a sharing of powers approach to separation of powers questions).
'9 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205, 208 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, JJ.) (explaining that sexual
intimacy is "a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to family life,
community welfare, and the development of human personality," and that "the
right of an individual to conduct intimate relationships in the intimacy of his or
her own home seems to me to be the heart of the Constitution's protection of
privacy") (citations omitted). The majority, per Justice White, noted that none of
the rights announced in the privacy line of cases resembles the alleged right to
engage in homosexual sodomy because there was no connection here, as in those
cases, with family, marriage or procreation. Id. at 191. Nor did those cases provide
constitutional insulation for any kind of private sexual conduct between consenting
adults, whether in the home or elsewhere. Id. Justice White added:
Nor are we inclined to take a more expansive view of our authority to
discover new fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause.
The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it
deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable
roots in the language or design of the Constitution.
Id. at 194.
' 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J.) (in determining what are our traditions for purposes of substantive due process analysis, the Court should consider
"the most specific level" at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified); id. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring with Kennedy, J.) (noting that Justice Scalia's proposed mode of historical
analysis, set forth in his footnote 6, may be somewhat inconsistent with past decisions because on occasion the Court has characterized relevant traditions protecting asserted rights at levels of generality that might not be "the most specific
level" available; thus, the Court should "not foreclose the unanticipated by the
prior imposition of a single mode of historical analysis.").
1 495 U.S. 604 (1990). The Supreme Court unanimously held that due process
does not bar a state from exercising personal jurisdiction in a divorce action based
on service of process on a nonresident temporarily in the forum state. Justice
Scalia, from a formalist perspective, said that the prevailing in-state service rule
was validated by its specific historical pedigree, "as the phrase 'traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice' makes clear." Id. at 621. Justice Rehnquist's
opinion contained the traditional Holmesian deference. He said that he "conducted
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The single consideration of whether the prior precedent is
rightly or wrongly decided carries the greatest weight with
instrumentalist judges. Because of their concern with advancing correct social policies' and the leeway that exists when
doing so,' instrumentalist judges feel freer than judges in
any of the other decisionmaking traditions to overrule prior
decisions believed to be wrongly decided." This is true even if
the prior precedents appear to represent settled law, there has
been substantial reliance on the precedents, or no additional
reason is present which calls for the precedent to be overruled.
The instrumentalist-era Warren Court proved this point. That
majority of Justices was willing to recognize new constitutional
rights and protections against governmental action in numerous areas of the law.' Indeed, perhaps apocryphally, it has
been said of Justice Douglas that he preferred to make precedents rather than follow them.'

no independent inquiry into the desirability of the prevailing in-state service rule,
leaving that judgment to the legislatures that are free to amend it." Id. In contrast, Justice Brennan, concurring, stated that while 'history is an important factor in establishing whether a jurisdictional rule satisfies due process requirements," it is not the only factor. Id. at 629. Rather, to be considered also is the
instrumentalist social policy concern of whether the rule of transient jurisdiction is
"fair" under modem conceptions of due process. Id.
See Kelso, Styles, supra note 1, at 213-14.
Kelso, Styles, supra note 1, at 215-16.
See generally Kelso, Styles, supra note 1, at 217-18.
This is with the exception of economic regulation. See, e.g., William J.
Brennan, The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S.
TEx. L.J. 433, 441-42 (1986) (summarizing the changes in constitutional doctrine
between 1961 and 1986 in terms of Bill of Rights, due process and equal protection clause doctrine); see generally JOHN DENTON CARTER, THE WARREN COURT
AND THE CONSTrrUION: A CRITICAL VIEW OF JUDICIAL ACIVISM, (1973); ARCHmBALD
COX, THE WARREN COURT. CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF RE-

FOII (1968); LOUIS LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT? A COMMIENTARY ON THE SUPREME
COURT'S POWER TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION (1975). This perspective continued to
have considerable influence during the years of the Burger Court (1969-1986),
although it was tempered because only four instrumentalists remained on the
bench (Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Douglas or, after 1975,
Stevens).
" Of course, where the proper social policies would be advanced by maintaining an adherence to instrumental-era precedents, an instrumentalist judge may be
as willing as any other judge to emphasize the importance of precedents. See, e.g.,
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 844 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). The true
test of how strongly a judge adheres to precedent, however, is not how much a
judge counsels following precedent with which the judge agrees, but whether the
judge is willing to follow a precedent with which the judge disagrees.
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B. RestraintsAssociated with Other Styles
1. Formal: Follow Precedent That Is Settled Law
As noted above, formalist and natural law judges typically
refrain from overruling a case thought to be wrongly decided if
the precedent has become "integrated into the fabric of the
law." 7 However, as also noted above, formalist judges do not
share the natural law belief that some additional special reason is required to overrule precedent." Thus, for formalist
judges, wrongly decided cases should be overruled unless they
represent settled law. For this reason, this restraint on overruling precedent is especially significant for formalist judges.
Justice Scalia phrased this point in his dissent in Planned
Parenthoodv. Casey as follows:
Justices should do what is legally right by asking two questions: (1)
Was Roe correctly decided? (2) Has Roe succeeded in producing a
settled body of law? If the answer to both questions is no, Roe
should undoubtedly be overruled."9

To decide whether a precedent represents settled law requires consideration of many factors. The age of the precedent
is certainly one factor, but it is not the sole determining factor.7" Judges may also ask whether the precedent case was

' See supra text accompanying notes 46-47. The phrase "fabric of the law" is
taken from Justice O'Connor's opinion in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115
S. Ct. 2097, 2116 (1995). In justifying the overruling of Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), Justice O'Connor stated:
It is worth pointing out the difference between the application of stare
decisis in this case and in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey. Casey explained how considerations of stare decisis inform the
decision whether to overrule a long-established precedent that has become
integrated into the fabric of the law. Overruling precedent of that kind
naturally may have consequences for "the ideal of the rule of law" . . . .
In addition, such precedent is likely to have engendered substantial reliance, as was true in Casey itself ....

But in this case . ..

we do not

face a precedent of that kind, because Metro Broadcastingitself departed
from our prior cases-and did so quite recently. By refusing to follow
Metro Broadcasting, then, we do not depart from the fabric of the law;
we restore it.
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2116 (citations omitted).
" See generally supra text accompanying notes 51-54.
'7 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 999 (1992)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
"' As Chief Justice Rehnquist observed in his Casey dissent, erroneous deci-
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itself a departure from prior precedents and gave little weight
to established traditions.7 A third factor concerning whether
a precedent can succeed in producing a settled body of law is

whether it is susceptible of principled application. Expressing
his unwillingness to follow a case which did not meet that test,
Justice Scalia recently stated:
When, however, a constitutional doctrine adopted by the Court is
not only mistaken but also insusceptible of principled application, I
do not feel bound to give it stare decisis effect-indeed, I do not feel
justified in doing so.!'

With respect to voting not to overrule a case because it
represents settled law, four examples can be consulted from
recent opinions by formalist Justices Scalia and Thomas. First,
although Justices Scalia and Thomas do not themselves believe
that the Framers and Ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment
intended the Due Process Clause to incorporate selectively the
Bill of Rights, they have indicated a willingness not to challenge the instrumental-era cases which have incorporated
almost all of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment, because that is a matter of settled law.7"

sions in constitutional cases are uniquely durable because it is so difficult to
amend the Constitution. Therefore, it is the Court's duty to reconsider interpretations that depart from a proper understanding of the Constitution, even if those
interpretations are long-lasting. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the major decisions of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), and Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905), were overruled many decades after they had been decided. Casey,
505 U.S. at 954-57 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
"' See, e.g., Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2116, overruling Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) ("Metro Broadcasting itself departed from our prior cases-and did so quite recently. By refusing to follow Metro Broadcasting, then, we
do not depart from the fabric of the law, we restore it.").
12 BMW of N. Am-, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1610 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Thomas, J.). This factor is obviously related to the natural law
concern with overruling precedents which are unworkable in practice. For discussion of unworkability as a grounds to overrule precedents, see infra text accompanying notes 95-113.
" See, eg., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711,
2726-27 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Thomas, J.) ( I am willing to accept the proposition that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
despite its textual limitation to procedure, incorporates certain substantive guarantees specified in the Bill of Rights . .. ."). For a summary of the current state of
selective incorporation after the instrumental era, see generally FAtBER ET AL.,
supra note 31, at 399-400.
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A second example comes from Employment Division v.
Smith.74 In that case, the Court, per Justice Scalia, held that
strict scrutiny should not be applied when a neutral, generally
applicable law is challenged by a free exercise claim unconnected with some other constitutional protection, such as freedom
of speech or the press.75 Nonetheless, the Court indicated in
Smith a willingness to continue using strict scrutiny in the
context of unemployment compensation cases, based solely on
the 1963 instrumental-era precedent of Sherbert v. Verner and
its progeny.76
A third example appears in Justice Thomas's concurrence
in United States v. Lopez.77 Focusing on the literal meaning of
commerce and on the specific intent of the Framers and Ratifiers of the Constitution, Justice Thomas concluded that the
Court's recent commerce clause jurisprudence and the "substantial effects" test were wrong because the Court had drifted
too far from the original understanding of the Commerce
Clause.78 However, Justice Thomas noted that it may be too
late to undertake a fundamental reexamination of precedents
written in the last sixty years. He said, "Consideration of stare
decisis and reliance interests
may convince us that we cannot
79
wipe the slate clean."
7' 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
7, Id. at 881.
76

Id.

at 883-85 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and its proge-

ny).

115 S. Ct. 1624, 1642 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Justice Thomas stated that if Congress could regulate all matters that
substantially affect interstate commerce, there would have been no need for many
71 Id.

of the specific grants of power in Article I, § 8.Id. at 1644. However, as Professor
Crosskey noted in his treatise on the Constitution, many of the items in the enumeration of powers in Article I, § 8 were included to make sure that powers
which had formerly been in the King (the executive) were transferred explicitly to
Congress and thus could not be understood as part of the President's power. WILLIAm CROSSKEY, 1 PoLiTIcs AND THE CONSTITUTION 411-28 (1953).
" Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1650 n.8. It may nonetheless be possible, as Justice
Thomas noted, for the Court to at least "temper" its commerce clause jurisprudence. Id. at 1650.
In their concurrence in Lopez, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor spoke even
more forcefully about the need to follow settled law with respect to the Commerce
Clause. They noted, "[Tihe Court as an institution and the legal system as a
whole have an immense stake in the stability of our commerce clause jurisprudence as it has evolved to this point .... That fundamental restraint [stare decisis] on our power forecloses us from reverting to an understanding of commerce
that would serve only an 18th-century economy ....
Congress can regulate in the
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A fourth example comes from opinions in dormant commerce clause cases. Justice Scalia has indicated he would
abandon traditional judicial scrutiny of state regulations under
the dormant Commerce Clause unless the state statute involves "rank discrimination against citizens of other states."S
Even so, he and Justice Thomas have stated that they will
follow the result of traditional dormant commerce clause analysis for current cases involving state laws "indistinguishable

from a type of law previously held unconstitutional by the
Court.""' Justice Scalia explicitly based his conclusion "on
stare dec/sis grounds." 2
2. Holmesian:
Upon

Follow Precedent

Substantially Relied

It is a familiar notion in many branches of the law that
where individuals have substantially relied to their detriment

on some promise, or some represented state of affairs, other
individuals may be estopped from changing or denying that
state of affairs in order to protect reliance interests.' In a
sense, this is also true of precedents. As Chief Justice
Rehnquist observed in Payne v. Tennessee,' "Considerations
in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases... where
reliance interests are involved ...

commercial sphere on the assumption that we have a single market and a unified
purpose to build a stable national economy." Id. at 1637.
Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232,
265 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
81West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 114 S. Ct 2205, 2220 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
concurring, joined by Thomas, J.).
82 Id.
8

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979) (promissory

estoppel).
" 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J.).
' Id. at 928 (citations omitted). The joint opinion in Casey and Justice
O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Adarand also make clear reference to the
impact that reliance on prior precedents can have on whether a precedent should
be overruled. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 US. 833,
856 (1992) (discussing the fact that for two decades people have organized intimate relationships in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that
contraception should fail); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097,
2116 (1995) ("[Sluch precedent is likely to have engendered substantial reliance, as
do not face a precedent
was true in Casey itself .... But in this case ... ,we
of that kind

. . .).
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In Payne, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that cases involving contract and property rights are the ones most likely to
engender the kind of substantial reliance that is important
from the perspective of stare decisis.86 More broadly, cases
where the principle of "not overruling cases which give rise to
substantial reliance" is likely to have most force are those
where overruling would upset "settled expectations" upon
which people have justifiably relied by making serious financial, business, employment, or other similar kinds of important
commitments. In contrast, according to Chief Justice
Rehnquist, cases involving procedural or evidentiary rules are
not as likely to involve such substantial reliance."
The extent to which a person's substantial reliance on
prior cases is reversible is an important, though typically unstated, aspect of this analysis. In the classic case of substantial
reliance, an individual has made a financial or employment
decision based on the current state of the law. If the law
changes, there is no practical way to restore the status quo.
Time has passed and other financial or employment opportunities have gone by the board. In a practical sense, reliance is irreversible. Yet there are other cases where persons can modify
their behavior with respect to a new law, and prior reliance is
reversible. Such cases do not present compelling circumstances
for the application of stare decisis based upon concern for substantial reliance.
In general, because Holmesian judges are more attuned
than formalist or natural law judges to this functional inquiry
into whether individuals have actually irreversibly relied,
Holmesian judges will be more sensitive to whether there has
actually been irreversible reliance when considering this restraint on overruling precedent. Thus, the analysis of this restraint is a special province of Holmesian judges. For example,
the natural law opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and
Souter in Casey noted that one reason not to overrule Roe was
substantial reliance on Roe.' The joint opinion noted that for
two decades people had organized intimate relationships in
reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that contra-

Payne, 501 U.S. at 828.
Id.
88 Casey, 505 U.S. at 856.
"'
87
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ception should fail." However, while reliance certainly did
exist between the time of Roe and Casey, that kind of reliance
is not irreversible. If Roe were overruled, nothing would bar
people in the future from organizing their intimate relationships on the basis of the fact that abortion might not be legally
available in certain states should contraception fail.'
In response, the Casey Court argued that women may
have made many irreversible decisions regarding education,
jobs, and social companions during the twenty years between
Roe and Casey, based on an assumption that they would always have the reproductive freedom granted by Roe.9" These
arguments, however, were only cursorily stated and quite undeveloped in Casey. Moreover, they were forcefully critiqued in
Chief Justice Rehnquist's Holmesian dissent.'
3. Natural Law: Follow Even Wrong Precedent Unless
Special Circumstances Exist
The theory of precedent associated with the natural law
style of decisionmaking suggests that judges may choose to
follow precedents they believe are wrongly decided even if
those precedents do not represent settled law and there has
been no substantial reliance upon them. To overrule a prece"Id.
"Id. ("This argument would be premised on the hypothesis that reproductive
planning could take virtually immediate account of any sudden restoration of state
authority to ban abortions."); id. at 956 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ([A]ny traditional notion of reliance is not applicable here.").
" Id. at 856 ("The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and
social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.... [Wihile the effect of reliance on Roe cannot be exactly measured, neither can the certain cost of overruling Roe for people who have ordered
their thinking and living around that case be dismissed.").
Id. at 956-57 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting):
The joint opinion thus turns to what can only be described as an unconventional-and unconvincing-notion of reliance, a view based on the
surmise that the availability of abortion since Roe has led to "two decades of economic and social developments" that would be undercut if the
error of Roe were recognized. The joint opinion's assertion of this fact is
undeveloped and totally conclusory .... Surely it is dubious to suggest
that women have reached their "places in society" in reliance upon Roe,
rather than as a result of their determination to obtain higher education
and compete with men in the job market, and of society's increasing
recognition of their ability to fill positions that were previously thought
to be reserved only for men.
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dent, some additional factor is needed. Based upon recent
cases, the additional factor can be grouped under five headings: (1) the precedent is unworkable in practice; (2) the precedent creates an inconsistency or incoherence in the law; (3) a
changed understanding of facts has undermined the factual
basis of the precedent; (4) the precedent represents a substantially wrong or substantially unjust interpretation of the Constitution; or (5) the precedent raises concerns about a commitment to the "Rule of Law."93 Though sometimes cited by judges from other decisionmaking styles in their opinions, these
factors are the special province of natural law judges.94 Each
will be discussed in turn below.
' See generally infra text accompanying notes 95-238. The Supreme Court has
also discussed these same factors in the context of statutory interpretation. See
Neal v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 763, 769 (1996) (quoting Patterson v. McClean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989) ("We have overruled our [statutory construction] precedents when the intervening development of the law has 'removed or
weakened the conceptual underpinnings from the prior decision, or where the later
law has rendered the decision irreconcilable with competing legal doctrines or
policies.'") (citations omitted); Patterson, 491 U.S. at 173-74 (Kennedy, J.) (stating
that the Court has overruled statutory construction precedents where "changes
have removed or weakened the conceptual underpinnings from the prior decision,
or where the later law has rendered the decision irreconcilable with competing
legal doctrines or policies, [or the] precedent may be a positive detriment to coherence and consistency in the law, either because of inherent confusion created by
an unworkable decision, or because the decision poses a direct obstacle to the
realization of important objectives embodied in other laws ....
[or] the precedent
becomes outdated and after 'being tested by experience, has been found to be
inconsistent with the sense of justice or with the social welfare.'") (citations omitted).
Indeed, the Court has noted the even greater force of stare decisis in the
area of statutory construction because of the easier resort to legislative amendment in such cases. Id. at 172-73 ("Considerations of stare decisis have special
force in the area of statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of
constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is implicated, and Congress
remains free to alter what we have done.").
" See generally supra text accompanying notes 51-54. Note that most of these
factors were discussed in the joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and
Souter in Casey, 505 U.S. at 855-69. In contrast, the formalist and Holmesian
Justices on the Supreme Court voted in Casey to overrule Roe based upon their
conclusions that Roe was wrongly decided, that Roe did not represent settled law,
and that no substantial reliance argument existed which required Roe to be affirmed. See supra notes 56, 69, 88-92 and accompanying text. These judges did not
engage in further analysis of identifying an additional special factor that would
justify overruling Roe.
With regard to statutory interpretation, it has also been natural law Justices
who have taken the lead in elaborating the "special reason" analysis to justify
overruling statutory interpretation precedents. See supra note 93.
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a. The Precedent Is Unworkable in Practice
If a doctrine has the practical result of immersing the
courts in resource squandering activity, it will be considered
unworkable. A recent case demonstrating such a situation was
the prisoners rights' case of Sandin v. Conner." In 1983, the
Court held in Hewitt v. Helm that in determining whether
prison regulations created a protected liberty interest, the
courts should ask whether the state had issued merely procedural guidelines, which would not create a liberty interest, or
had used language of mandatory character, which would create
a liberty interest.97 In Sandin, the Court abandoned the
Hewitt methodology, noting that it had produced two undesirable effects: (1) it had led to the involvement of federal courts
in the resource squandering activity of day-to-day management
of prisons; and (2) it had created disincentives for states to
codify prison management procedures. 9
Another kind of unworkable situation occurs- where applying a test articulated by the Supreme Court leads to the specter of continuing splits in lower court decisions. In 1976, in a
5-4 opinion, the Court held in National League of Cities v.
Usery " that the Tenth Amendment prevents Congress from
applying its commerce clause power in a manner which direct-

9' 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995).
459 U.S. 460 (1983).

An example of a liberty interest occurred in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539 (1974). There, a prisoner had been given a constitutionally protected liberty

interest by a state statute that bestowed mandatory sentence reduction for good
behavior (subject to change for serious misconduct). The Court stated that the
interest conferred by the law was one of 'real substance." Id. at 557.
" 115 S. Ct. at 2299-2300. The new methodology will be to ask whether the
prison regulation represents a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of the
sentence. Id. at 2301. Ia the case at bar, disciplining a prisoner by 30 days of

segregated confinement, which did not inevitably affect the duration of the sentence, and which was under conditions mirroring those imposed by administrative
and protective custody, did not present the typical, significant deprivation in which
a state might conceivably have created a liberty interest. rd.
Another clear example of this kind of juridical situation occurred in first
amendment obscenity doctrine during the 1960s. At that time, appellate courts had
to determine for themselves whether various books or movies were obscene. See,
e.g., Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), and its progeny. That approach was overruled in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), which placed the
burden of those findings on juries.
" 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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ly displaces the freedom of states to "structure integral operations in areas of traditional government functions."' This
holding was limited, as stated in Justice Blackmun's concurrence, if the federal interest is very strong and state compliance would be essential.' As a result, Congress could not
apply the Fair Labor Standards Act's minimum hour and minimum wage provisions to employees of the states and their
political subdivisions.0 2
Nine years later, the Court overruled National League of
Cities in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority. ' 3 Justice Blackmun's principal justification for changing
his mind and voting to overrule the case in which he had concurred nine years earlier was that National League of Cities
proved to be unworkable in practice.' 4 In particular, Justice
Blackmun explained that National League of Cities required
courts to determine what are "traditional governmental functions" as opposed to "non-traditional governmental functions"
or "non-governmental functions." Nine years of experience with
National League of Cities showed the difficulty of drawing this
distinction.' 5 Furthermore, Justice Blackmun did not en-

z® Id. at 852.
101 This

additional limitation in National League of Cities derives from Justice
Blackmun's concurrence in the case as the critical fifth vote to make up the majority in favor of state's rights. Id. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
102 Id. at 852.
1

469 U.S. 528 (1985).

Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Note that
although Justice Blackmun became more of a liberal instrumentalist during his
years on the Court, Justice Blackmun always had some fondness for the natural
law decisionmaking style. See Kelso, Separation of Powers, supra note 1, at 602
n.266. The more pure instrumental approach to National League of Cities-that it
should be overruled just because its doctrine is wrong-appeared in Justice
Stevens's concurrence in EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 248-50 (1983).
105 As Justice Blackmun stated in Garcia,
[jiust how troublesome the task has been is revealed by the results
reached in other federal cases. Thus, courts have held that regulating
ambulance services, licensing automobile drivers, operating a municipal
airport, performing solid waste disposal, and operating a highway authority are functions protected under National League of Cities. At the same
time, courts have held that issuance of industrial development bonds,
regulation of intrastate natural gas sales, regulation of traffic on public
roads, regulation of air transportation, operation of a telephone system,
leasing and sale of natural gas, operation of a mental health facility, and
provision of in-house domestic services for the aged and handicapped, are
not entitled to immunity. We find it difficult, if not impossible, to identi104
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vision a way that the Court could ever develop a principled approach to this issue.' Thus, said Justice Blackmun, it was
appropriate to overrule National League of Cities."
Another example of a doctrine being limited in practice be-

cause of its apparent doctrinal unworkability is Lemon v.
Kurtzman.'

Between 1971 and 1992, the "Lemon test

was

applied in a large number of cases dealing with the meaning of
the Establishment Clause.0 9 Court decisions drawing the dis-

tinction called for by the Lemon test--between what is a "principal or primary" advancement of religion versus merely "incidentally" advancing religion-have proven difficult to explain

on any principled basis."

Similar confused results have

fy an organizing principle [in these decisions]. The constitutional distinction between licensing drivers and regulating traffic, for example, or
between operating a highway authority and operating a mental health
facility, is elusive at best.
469 U.S. at 538-39 (citations omitted).
Id. 'at 540-47 (rejecting the possibility of developing workable guidelines
based upon distinctions between governmental and proprietary activities, or a pure
historical approach to traditional governmental functions, or determination of what
is "uniquely" a governmental function, or an "essential" governmental function).
Justice Blackmun also noted that in any event it was 'unsound in principle" for
the Court to try to determine what are "essential" governmental functions because
that improperly but 'inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make
decisions about which state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes." Id. at
546.
" There is, of course, a real debate on the Court over whether the general
principle announced in National League of Cities is rightly or wrongly decided.
Indeed, the proper division of authority between the federal government and the
states has been a perennial issue in constitutional law. In general, instrumental
judges have found in the circumstances of drafting and ratifying the Constitution
and its text an intention to create a very substantial federal government, with
powers to deal effectively with all kinds of national problems, unhampered by
concerns about state autonomy. See generally Kelso, Styles, supra note 1, at 21920. Noninstrumental judges, to differing extents, have found in the same background an intent to give more weight to state autonomy as a factor in the balance. Kelso, Styles, supra note 1, at 201-03.
'03 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
"o Under Lemon, when a law is challenged under the Establishment Clause, on
its face or as applied, the government must establish that:
1. the law has a secular legislative purpose;
2. its principal or primary effect is not to advance religion, though it
may incidentally advance religion; and
3. it doesn't further excessive governmental entanglement with religion.
IMt at 612-13.
...For example, merely looking at the results of the Lemon test in the context
of government aid to private schools, the Court found a primary effect to advance
religion in providing funds to repair physical facilities at a private religious school,
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come from trying to determine under Lemon whether "excessive entanglement" exists."' And even court decisions under
the first prong of Lemon concerning governmental purpose
Thus, from 1992 on,
have not been particularly predictable.'
the Court has increasingly been ignoring Lemon when rendering its decisions. 13 Lemon has not been officially overruled,
Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977), but only an incidental effect where funds
were provided to build "secular" buildings on a religious campus, Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); a primary effect to advance religion by providing loans
of instructional equipment and materials to private schools, Wolman v. Walter, 433
U.S. 229 (1977), but only an incidental effect to provide "secular" textbooks to
students, Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980); a primary effect to advance religion of a "released time" program where public schools are turned over to religious
instruction, Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948), but
only incidental effect where students on a "released time" program leave public
school grounds to get religious instruction; and a primary effect to advance religion to provide tuition grants to parents of children attending private schools,
Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973),
but only incidental effect where tax benefits for textbooks, tuition and transportation granted to parents for children in public or private schools, despite the fact
that parents of children in private schools will get most of the benefit, since private tuition is the main part of the expense, and 96% of children attending private school in the state attended religious schools. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388
(1983).
. Compare Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (attempt to police the risk
that religious messages will be conveyed in a school program funded by public
funds constitutes excessive entanglement of religion) with Roemer v. Board of Pub.
Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (no excessive entanglement in annual state
grants to private colleges, including religiously affiliated institutions, although four
judges dissenting would have found excessive entanglement from dependency on
grant money).
112 See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.) ("Our cases interpreting and applying the purpose
test have made such a maze of the Establishment Clause that even the most
conscientious governmental officials can only guess what motives will be held unconstitutional.").
1'
See, e.g., Resenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct.
2510 (1995); Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440
(1995); Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct.
2481 (1994); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993); see
also Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141,
2149 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation of Lemon was unsettling and unnecessary); id. at 2149-50 (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Thomas, J.) (declining to
apply Lemon and noting, "Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and
buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and school attorneys of Center Moriches Union Free School
District.").
In Kiryas Joel, Justice O'Connor phrased the unworkability aspect of Lemon
in terms of Lemon's unsuccessful attempt to create a unitary analysis of establish-
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however, because there is no clear majority on the Court in
14
favor of a different test."
b. The Precedent Creates Inconsistency or Incoherence
in the Law
If a prior case is perceived to be "out-of-sync" with related
law, judges are more likely to overrule it." A recent series of
cases dealing with this issue involved race based affirmative
action. In the fountainhead case, Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke," 6 five Justices struggled to determine
what level of review should apply to governmental affirmative
action programs based upon race. Justice Brennan, on behalf
of four Justices, held that only intermediate scrutiny should be
applied to race based affirmative action, although strict scrutiny is applied to discrimination against racial minorities." 7
Justice Powell, whose vote was decisive, concluded that strict
scrutiny should be applied to affirmative action, just as strict
scrutiny is applied to laws which discriminate against minority
1
groups based upon race."
With regard to state affirmative action programs, Justice
Powel's approach triumphed over Justice Brennan's approach
in Richmond v. Croson."9 In Croson, a majority of the Court
applied strict scrutiny to a state affirmative action program,
over a dissent by Justice Marshall, in which Justices Brennan
and Blackmun joined.' The majority's conclusion was based

ment clause doctrine, an attempt which had clearly proven unworkable in the
context of free speech doctrine. 114 S. Ct. at 2498-99.
1
Instead, the Justices have become quite diverse in their understanding of the
Establishment Clause. See generally supra note 57; Kelso, Natural Law Tradition,
supra note 14, at 1084-85; Kelso, Styles, supra note 1, at 178-79, 193-94, 209-10,
223.
1 This is particularly true for formalist or natural law judges, whose analytic
perspective on the nature of law, see supra text accompanying notes 12-13, 34,
makes them quite sensitive to logical anomalies in legal doctrine.
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
Id. at 356-59.
118 Id. at 291.
*9 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
116
117

'L Id. at 493-98; id. at 528 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and
Blackmun, JJ.).
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in part on the logical consistency of applying the same standard of review to discrimination against individuals, no matter
121
what their race.
Regarding federal affirmative action programs, however,
Justice Brennan assembled a five-Justice majority for application of the intermediate standard of review in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC. 22 Justice Brennan based his reasoning
in part on Fullilove v. Klutznick,r a case concerning a federal affirmative action program where the Court did not clearly
choose between applying intermediate or strict scrutiny. 24 By

121 Id.

at 494. Instrumental Justices have disagreed with this premise. Perceiving that our nation has experienced and continues to experience various forms of
racism, they have consistently called for no more than intermediate or mid-level
scrutiny for equal protection review of affirmative action programs. As stated by
Justice Marshall, dissenting in City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 535
(1989), and quoting from Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359, "My view has long been that
race-conscious classifications designed to further remedial goals 'must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives' in order to withstand constitutional scrutiny." This requirement of
a substantial government interest is readily met by an intent to remedy the ef.
fects of past discrimination, Croson, 488 U.S. at 536-37, or to create diversity
where that can produce significant benefits. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
476 U.S. 267, 306 (1986) (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting). Applying mid-level review, instrumentalist Justices Brennan, Marshall
and Blackmun did not find that any affirmative action program reviewed by the
Court during their service on the bench failed substantially to relate to the
achievement of goals that were substantial.
' Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 563-66 (1990). Metro Broadcasting involved a congressional program which gave racial preferences in proceedings for new broadcast licenses and in certain proceedings for the sale of existing
radio and television stations. Id. at 552-58.
123 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
124 See generally id. at 491-92 (Burger, C.J., joined by Powell and White, JJ.);
id. at 495-96 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 517-23 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment). The majority in Metro
Broadcasting was made up of the four instrumentalist Justices who typically argue
for intermediate scrutiny, and Justice White, whose Holmesian deference, particularly to the federal government, apparently led him to distinguish between the
state affirmative action program in Croson and federal affirmative action programs.
See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 563 ("It is of overriding significance in these
cases that the FCC's minority ownership programs have been specifically approved-indeed, mandated-by Congress."). It must be noted also that Justice
White joined Justice Brennan's opinion in Bakke, which applied intermediate scrutiny to a state affirmative action program. 438 U.S. at 324. This suggests some
support by Justice White for affirmative action, though Justice White also joined
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke which applied strict scrutiny, id. at 387 n.7, and
though Justice White voted in Croson for strict scrutiny of state affirmative action.
488 U.S. at 475.
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1995, however, four of the five Justices in the majority in Metro Broadcasting retired from the Court (Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun and White). In Adarand Constructors v.
Pena," the Court overruled Metro Broadcasting, and held
that to the extent (if any) that Fullilove held federal racial
classifications subject to less than strict scrutiny, it was no
longer controlling. Justice O'Connor's majority opinion noted
that the justification for strict scrutiny was initially explained
by Justice Powell in Bakke. 6 She stated that the principle of
strict scrutiny was not abandoned in Fullilove, was put in
place by Croson, erroneously abandoned in Metro Broadcasting,
and, now, in Adarand was being restored. Focusing on Metro
Broadcasting as a precedent, Justice O'Connor first noted that
because the Equal Protection Clause protects individuals of all
races equally, Metro Broadcastingwrongly applied a different
level of scrutiny to federal affirmative action programs.'
Second, she noted that Metro Broadcasting had not become
part of the fabric of the law, and, because it was such a recent
decision, it had not given rise to substantial reliance.'" Thus,
it was ripe for overruling. Turning to consideration of an additional factor, which is usually necessary for natural law jurists
to overrule precedent, Justice O'Connor noted that Metro
Broadcastingwas inconsistent with the rest of equal protection
and due process jurisprudence that treats individuals as individuals, and applies the same level of scrutiny to discrimination, for or against a respective group.'

.=
115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
'
127

Id. at 2108-09 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-90).
Id. at 2112-13.
Id. at 2116.

For example, in the case of gender-based discrimination, discrimination for or
against women or men, based upon gender, triggers the same level of scrutiny. Id.
at 2114-15. The Court also cited in Adarand a number of other cases where the
Supreme Court had overruled prior precedents based on "inconsistency" with "accepted and established doctrine." Id. at 2115-16.
Four Justices dissented in Adarand. Justice Souter, who had joined with Justices O'Connor and Kennedy in Casey, was joined in dissent by Justices Ginsburg
and Breyer. Justice Souter noted that since the challengers in this case had not
identified any factual premises on which Fullilove rested as having disappeared
since the case was decided, stare decisis compelled its application, and that gave
Metro Broadcasting an adequate foundation. Id. at 2131 (Souter, J., joined by
Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting). However, despite the fact that no factual
circumstances had changed between Fullitoue and Adarand, that is just one of the
possible additional reasons which can be used to justify overruling a precedent.
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A second recent example of the Court overruling a prior
case thought to be inconsistent with developed doctrine can be
found in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island."' The question
in Liquormart was whether to follow what had become the
standard application of the "CentralHudson" test for commercial speech, 3 ' or whether to follow an earlier case, Posadas
de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Company of Puerto Rico. "32
' In Posadas, the Court, in an opinion by Justice
Rehnquist, deferred to the government's view that the statute
was sufficiently narrowly tailored.' 3 The Court said in
Liquormart that Posadas was wrongly decided in terms of the
level of protection given under standard commercial speech
doctrine." 4 The Court noted that Posadas had in no sense
become settled law and was inconsistent with the rest of the
commercial speech cases. "' For these reasons, Posadas was
overruled." 6

The reason cited by Justice O'Connor, inconsistency with related doctrine, is an
independent reason which can justify a precedent being overruled.
Justice Stevens, also dissenting, with Justice Ginsburg, reiterated the usual
instrumental position that a number of reasons support using a standard of review
which gives some deference to congressional efforts to create affirmative action
programs. Governing impartially, he said, does not require that courts ignore the
moral and constitutional difference between a policy designed to perpetuate a caste
system and one that seeks to eradicate racial subordination. Id. at 2120-23
(Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
130 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
13' This test requires a mid-level analysis into whether the regulation at issue
was sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve substantial government ends.
132 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
13 The issue was so articulated in Liquormart. 116 S. Ct. at 1511.
134 Id.
("Given our long-standing hostility to commercial speech regulation of
this type, Posadas clearly erred in concluding that it was 'up to the legislature' to
choose suppression over a less speech-reltrictive policy.").
13 Id.
("The Posadas majority's conclusion . . . cannot be reconciled with the
unbroken line of prior cases ....
Because the 5-to-4 decision in Posadas marked
such a sharp break from aur prior precedent, ...
we decline to give force to its
highly deferential approach.").
,26 Id. at 1510-14. It is perhaps interesting to note that even Chief Justice
Rehnquist, -author of the Posadas opinion, joined in a concurring opinion which
agreed that Posadas should be overruled, though Chief Justice Rehnquist did not
join in Justice Stevens's plurality opinion which explained in full the reasons for
its overruling. Id. at 1520-22.
The Court also overruled Posadas with respect to its discussion of whether
the "greater" government power to ban an activity includes the "lesser" power to
regulate the activity any way the government wants. The Court explained why it
was wrong to think that the power to ban entirely "an activity" means that any
regulation of "speech" is permissible, since regulating "speech" triggers the First
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Another area where the Court has altered precedents to
promote greater consistency or coherence in the law involves
the Takings Clause doctrine. Precedents from the instrumental
era made it more difficult to prove a taking, unless a clear
physical occupation of property occurred.' For example, in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City," Justice
Brennan, for a 6-3 Court, tested whether New York's Landmarks Preservation Law, as applied, was a regulatory taking.
The Court did so by asking whether the property owner proved
that the effects on its rights in a parcel, considered as a whole,
were not substantially related to the general welfare or were
unduly harsh. Applying this test, the Court held that denying
permission to build a fifty-story building atop Grand Central
Terminal was not a taking where the terminal's air rights were
transferred to nearby parcels and the owner could continue to
have reasonable beneficial uses on the site.so
The force of Penn Central as a precedent was extended in
1987 when, in Keystone v. DeBenedictis, the Court found no
taking caused by a requirement that coal companies keep in
place fifty percent of the coal beneath certain structures. The
Court, in a 5-4 opinion by Justice Stevens, said the coal companies had not shown that the law failed to substantially advance a legitimate state interest or that it denied them economically viable use of their land."'

Amendment, where banning activity does not. The Court also in earlier cases had
pointed out that this "greater" necessarily includes the "lesere argument had been
rejected in first amendment cases outside the commercial speech area. Thus, this
aspect of Posadas was also "inconsistent with both logic and well-settled doctrine?
Id. at 1512.
1
See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435-40
(1980). The Court has also agreed that complete deprivations of property rights
trigger the takings clause. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct.
2886, 2894-95 (1992).
"

438 U.S. 104 (1978).

Id. at 128-38. The dissent pointed out that the taking of air rights, which
should be treated separately, was not offset by increases in value attributable to
similar restrictions on neighboring properties. Id. at 138-41 (Rehnquist, J., joined
by Burger, C.J., and Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus, property rights had been taken. Id. at 142-44.
1" Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 US. 470 (1987).
141 Id.
at 502-06. The dissent stated that Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393 (1922), dictated the finding of a taking. For the dissenters, Chief Justice
Rehnquist further complained that the Court refused to treat the tons of coal that
must remain in the ground as a separate segment of property for taking purposes.
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These opinions, by limiting takings clause protections for
property, basically reduced constitutional analysis of this kind
of economic regulation to minimum rationality review under
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. However, more
recently, the Court has begun, by incremental steps, to restore
a higher level of review. For example, in Nollan v. California,4 2 the Court held there was a taking where a building
permit was conditioned on the owner granting a lateral easement across his beach. The easement did not substantially
advance visual access of the beach from a roadway, although
that was the state's stated rationale for imposing the condition.13 Seven years later, a property protective corollary of
the "substantially" advance rule was created in Dolan v. City of
Tigard.' There the Court held that where a city makes an
adjudicative decision to condition the approval of a building
permit for an individual parcel on the owner giving up some
property rights, the city must show not only that there is a
nexus between a legitimate state interest and the permit condition, as called for in Nollan, but also that the degree of the
exaction demanded by the city bears a "rough proportionality"
to the projected impact of the proposed development."'
The Court justified its Dolan decision in terms of consistency with related constitutional law doctrines.' The Court
noted that when the government singles out an individual for a
search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, or singles
out a government worker for discipline because of speaking on
a matter of public concern under the First Amendment, the
Court does not apply a deferential minimum rationality review
standard. 47 Instead, it applies a real, rational review balancing of individual versus governmental interests, and the bur-

Keystone, 480 U.S. at 506-09 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Powell, O'Connor and
Scalia, JJ., dissenting).
142 483 U.S. 825 (1987).

' Id. at 834-42. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissenting, stated
that it should be enough that the state's action was rational. Id. at 842-48.
14 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
14 Id. at 2318-20. Chief Justice Rehnquist, for the Court, explained: "No precise

mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and
extent to the impact of the proposed development." Id. at 2319-20.
14 Id.
at 2320.
147

Id.
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den is on the government to show that its action, in this balance, is constitutional.' Noting that the Takings Clause is
"as much as part of the Bill of Rights as the First Amendment
or Fourth Amendment," the Court held that a similar standard
of rational review balancing, with the burden on the government, should be applied where an individual property owner is
singled out for a permit condition.'
c. A Changed Understandingof Facts
Undermines the Precedent
A third reason for overruling or limiting a precedent is
that new information casts doubt on its factual assumptions.
In one of the most famous examples, the Court stated in
Brown v. Board of Education that although public education
was scant when the Civil War Amendments were drafted and
ratified, public education by 1954 had come to be the most
important function of state governments and a vital opportunity if persons were to be readied for participation in society."
Furthermore, by 1954 the Court had developed the conviction
that legally enforced segregation had deleterious effects on
minority students.' As a result, a unanimous Court held
that anything to the contrary in Plessy v. Ferguson" was
overruled."5

" See, e.g., Rankin v. MacPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987) (first amendment case
dealing with the rights of government workers to speak on matters of public concern); Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (fourth amendment search
and seizure case).
"' Dolan, 114 S. Ct at 2320. In previous articles discussing the various standards of review, we have called this standard of review 'third-order" rational review. See, eg., R. Randall Kelso, Three Years Hence: An Update on Filling Gaps in
the Supreme Court's Approach to Constitutional Review of Legislation, 36 S. TEX.
L.J. 1, 12-15 (1995).
1- 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954).
. Id. at 494-95.
12 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
" See generally Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 863 (1992) ("While we think Plessy was wrong the day it was decided, see
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552-64 (Harlan, J., dissenting), we must also recognize that the
Plessy Court's explanation for its decision was so clearly at odds with the facts
apparent to the Court in 1954 that the decision to reexamine Plessy was on this
ground alone not only justified but required.").
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A second famous example of a critical change in factual
perception can be seen in the overruling of Lochner v. New
M
York by West Coast Hotel v. Parrish."
As the Court stated in
Casey, "[iun the meantime the Depression had come and, with
it, the lesson that seemed unmistakable to most people by
1937, [was] that the interpretation of contractual freedom
protected [by Lochner] rested on fundamentally false factual
assumptions about the capacity of a relatively unregulated
market to satisfy minimal levels of human welfare." '55
d. The PrecedentIs Substantially Wrongly Decided or
Represents a SubstantialInjustice
A fourth condition that may justify to a natural law judge
an overruling of wrongly decided precedent is when the prior
opinion is "inconsistent with [a] sense of justice" 6' or is "so
clearly a[n] error that its enforcement [is] for that very reason
doomed."15 7 The post-instrumental Supreme Court has applied this doctrine most forcefully in cases raising structural
issues of constitutional law. As Justice Kennedy has noted,
structural issues are those involving "separation of powers,
checks and balances, judicial review, and federalism. ' 8
Thus, instrumental-era precedents which reflect a different
vision of separation of powers, checks and balances, judicial

300 U.S. 379 (1937), overruling Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
505 U.S. at 861-62. The Court continued, "The facts upon which the earlier
case had premised a constitutional resolution of social controversy had proven to
be untrue, and history's demonstration of their untruth not only justified but re15

155

quired the new choice of constitutional principle .

. . ."

Id. at 862.

In contrast to this view, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated in his dissent that
the joint opinion's approval of the overruling of Plessy and Lochner, on grounds
that the nation and the Court had learned new lessons in the interim, was "at
best a feebly supported, post hoc rationalization for those decisions." Id. at 960.
The opinions in those cases, stated Chief Justice Rehnquist, both rested simply on
a judgment that the Court had been mistaken in the earlier cases on a matter of
constitutional law-not whether the public had changed its beliefs. Id. at 960-63.
Thus, without regard to whether any additional special circumstance existed, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, a Holmesian judge, supported the overruling of Plessy and
Lochner. This is consistent with the thesis of this Article that the "special reason"
justification for overruling precedent is the special province of natural law judges.
'' Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S 164, 174 (1989).
117

Casey, 505 U.S. at 854.

" United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1637-38 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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review or federalism than held by post-instrumental Justices,
are among the cases ripe for narrowing or overruling because
they appear to many non-instrumental Justices to be substantially wrong.
One example of this process at work involves the narrowof
ing federal governmental power under the Commerce Clause
that occurred in United States v. Lopez. ' Chief Justice
Rehnquist, for the 5-4 majority, held it beyond Congress' commerce clause power to bar the possession of a gun in a school
yard because that kind of non-economic activity did not substantially affect interstate commerce." c Justice Kennedy,
concurring with Justice O'Connor, brought federalism concerns
clearly to the surface in his opinion. Justice Kennedy noted
that he saw the case in terms of broad principles reflecting the
role of the Court and the significance of federalism in the
whole structure of the Constitution. Kennedy noted that of the
various structural elements in the Constitution, the Framers
had made a unique contribution to political science and political theory by their insight that freedom was enhanced by the
creation of two governments, rather than one.1"' However, if
the federal government could take over the regulation of entire
areas of traditional state concern, such as education, the

15
11

115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
Id. at 1634. Prior to Lopez, there had been an unbroken line of unsuccessful

challenges to exercises of congressional commerce clause power, extending all the
way back to 1937. See, eg., Russell v. United States, 471 US. 858 (1985); Hodel
v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Perez
v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294
(1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 US. 100
(1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). Chief Justice
Rehnquist distinguished these cases from Lopez on the ground that they had sustained regulations of activities that arose out of or were connected with commercial transactions that, viewed in the aggregate, substantially affected interstate
commerce. Here, in contrast, the criminal statute by its terms had nothing to do
with "commerce" or any sort of economic enterprise. 115 S. Ct at 162833. As

indicated above, Justice Thomas also concurred in the case based upon even a
more limited understanding of federal power under the Commerce Clause See
supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
161 Justice Kennedy continued that among 'the various structural elements in
the Constitution-separation of powers, checks and balances, judicial review, and
federalism-only concerning the last does there seem to be much uncertainty re-

specting the existence, and the content, of standards that allow the judiciary to
play a significant role in maintaining the design contemplated by the Framers."
Lopez, 115 S. Ct at 1637-38.
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boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority
would blur, and political responsibility would become illusory.
Also, local programs for the prohibition of 1guns
would be in
62
danger of displacement by federal authority.
Justice Souter's dissent in Lopez picked up on faithfulness
to another aspect of structural concerns: the role of the court in
a case involving minimum rationality review. Under standard
minimum rationality review, the Court should defer to legislative judgments about whether a rational connection exists be-.
tween means and ends, unless the congressional judgment is
wholly irrational, which it was not in this case."s Justice
Breyer, in his dissent, also noted that it was rational for Congress to think that such a connection exists.' Justice Souter
agreed, and stated that he was thus not convinced that following the sixty years of precedent supporting exercises of federal
authority would represent a substantial error in this case.'65
162
163
16

Id. at 1638-39 (Kennedy, J., joined by O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 1651-52 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Justice Breyer stated there was a substantial connection between gun-related

school violence and interstate commerce. Id. at 1659 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens,
Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). Reports and hearings had made clear that
the problem of guns around schools is widespread and dangerous; it significantly
interferes with the quality of education in schools; and education today is intertwined with the nation's economy because more jobs now demand greater educational skills, and many firms base location decisions on the presence, or absence,
of a workforce with a basic education. Id.
In his opinion Chief Justice Rehnquist replied to Justice Breyer's dissent by
stating that under Justice Breyer's approach Congress could regulate not only all
violent crimes but also all activities that might lead to violent crime, including
marriage, divorce and custody. Also, Congress could regulate the educational process directly because its quality could be regulated as a fact having a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. Id. at 1632. Justice Breyer denied that this was a
necessary consequence of his view. He explained that the law at issue hero was
aimed at curbing a particularly acute threat to the educational process. He added
that "the immediacy of the connection between education and the national economic well-being is documented by scholars and accepted by society at large in a way
and to a degree that may not hold true for other social institutions." Id. at 1662.
" Id. at 1654. Justice Souter stated that in determining whether there has
been a rationally based legislative judgment that a subject substantially affects
interstate commerce, the Court should not consider whether the subject relates to
customary state concerns or the statute contains explicit factual findings. To consider findings would be to imply a judicial authority to review which does not
exist or would impose on Congress a duty to act with some high degree of deliberateness, and that would be a review for congressional wisdom which the Court
properly abandoned in 1937. Souter hoped this case did not "portend a return to
[that] untenable jurisprudence." Id.
In addition to Justice Souter's and Justice Breyer's dissents, discussed above,
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Another example of a post-instrumental majority on the
Court overruling a "federalism" precedent felt to be substantially wrong is Seminole Tribe of Florida v. FMorida,'" which
overruled Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co."6 ' In Seminole

Tribe, both the majority and dissenting opinions stated that
cases which present a substantially wrong understanding of
the Eleventh Amendment should be overruled or limited. A 5-4
Court had held earlier in Union Gas that Congress, when exercising its commerce clause power, could authorize law suits in
federal court against states on federal question grounds--even
though that seems literally to be barred by the Eleventh
Amendment." Justice Brennan's reasoning was that when
the states ratified the Constitution they consented to suits
against them in federal courts based on congressionally created
causes of action." 9 In Seminole Tribe, Chief Justice
Rehnquist adopted the reasoning of the Union Gas dissent to
claim that this understanding of the Eleventh Amendment was
wrong.' As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, the result and

see supra text accompanying notes 158-160, a separate dissent was filed by Justice
Stevens. Justice Stevens stated that the possession of guns is the result of commercial activity, that Congress can prohibit the possession of guns at any location,
and that, therefore, Congress can prohibit gun possession in particular markets.
Id. at 1651 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
For the future it seems clear, as stated by Justice Souter in his dissent, that
Lopez is not an "epochal" casb. Id. at 1657. But it does send a message to Congress that it should consider federalism concerns when legislating near the outer
reaches of its commerce clause power, and it should do something to make clear
how Congress perceives a connection between its regulation and interstate commerce.
166 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
167 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
'
Id. at 17-20. The result in this case was supported by the four instrumental
Justices on the Court at the time (Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and
Stevens), with the critical fifth vote provided by Justice White, who wrote a concurring opinion which stated he disagreed with much of Justice Brennan's reasoning. Id. at 57 (White, J., concurring). So while this 1989 case was not within the
usual time frame for an instrumental decision, the holding and the reasoning of
the Brennan plurality were very much instrumental.
16s Id. at 17-20.
170 116 S. Ct. at 1127-28. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion tracked the fourJustice dissent in Union Gas. In Union Gas, the dissent had stated that Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), had declared that federal jurisdiction over unconsenting states "was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the United States." 491 U.S. at 32 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part, joined in part by Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor and Kennedy, JJ.)
(quoting Hans, 134 U.S. at 15). Justice Brennan disagreed with this position in
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rationale departed from established understanding of the Eleventh Amendment and undermined the accepted function of Article III-since never before had the Court suggested that the
bounds of Article III could be expanded by Congress operating
under any constitutional provision except the Fourteenth
Amendment. 71
Justice Souter, dissenting with Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer, took issue with Chief Justice Rehnquist's conclusion
that the Court's decision in Union Gas was substantially
wrong. Instead, Justice Souter concluded that, based upon
constitutional history and text, the famous Eleventh Amendment case, Hans v. Louisiana,'72 was substantially wrong in
holding that a state could plead sovereign immunity against a
noncitizen suing under federal question jurisdiction, and, for
that reason, a state must enjoy the same protection in a suit
by one of its own citizens.'73 Beyond that, Justice Souter conUnion Gas, stating that Hans considered only the federal jurisdiction granted by
Article III and given effect by the Judiciary Act, an act designed to implement
Article III grants of jurisdiction. Article III did not automatically eliminate sovereign immunity, stated Justice Brennan, and so neither did the Judiciary Act. And
Hans did not deal with Congress' authority under other clauses. Id. at 17-20.
171 Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1128. Chief Justice Rehnquist also noted that
Union Gas was always of questionable precedential value, largely because a majority had expressed disagreement with the rationale of the plurality. On this point,
see infra text accompanying notes 250-252.
Chief Justice Rehnquist went on to hold that the Governor of Florida could
not be sued for prospective injunctive relief under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908), because Congress here had prescribed a detailed remedial
scheme for enforcement of a statutorily created right. It would be inappropriate for
the Court to supplement that scheme with one created by the judiciary, stated
Chief Justice Rehnquist, citing Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988).
172 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
173 Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1153-60. Justice Stevens, dissenting, also supported this conclusion that Hans, as read by Chief Justice Rehnquist, was wrongly
decided. Justice Stevens stated that the Eleventh Amendment applies only to suits
premised on diversity jurisdiction. He read Hans more narrowly than did Chief
Justice Rehnquist, to hold only that as a matter of federal common law, federal
courts should decline to entertain suits against unconsenting states. He was especially concerned that the majority's opinion would prevent Congress from providing
a federal forum for a broad range of actions against states. He stated that the
sovereignty of the states is subordinate both to the citizenry of each state and the
supreme law of the sovereign. He added that no one had identified any acceptable
reason for concluding that the absence of a state's consent to be sued in federal
court should affect the power of Congress to authorize federal courts to remedy
violations of federal law by states or their officials in actions not covered by the
Eleventh Amendment's explicit text. Id. at 1133-45. It must be noted that the
arguments of Justice Stevens are instrumental in nature. Although he undertakes
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tended that the Court in Hans had misread statements in The
FederalistPapersand that Hans wrongly did not even consider
whether Congress could abrogate the state's sovereign immunity by statute. Souter then explored historical materials to show
that even those Framers who expected common-law immunity
to survive ratification were talking about diversity jurisdiction,
and that American political thought at the time of framing had
so revolutionized the concept of sovereignty that it would have
been illogical to call for the immunity of a state against the
Thus, although Justice
jurisdiction of the national courts.'
Souter disagreed with Chief Justice Rehnquist and the majority opinion over which prior Eleventh Amendment case was
wrongly decided, they both agreed that a precedent regarding
an Eleventh Amendment federalism issue was wrongly decided
and should not be followed. 75
A third recent example where a majority of the current
post-instrumental Court has concluded that federalism concerns require a modest change in doctrine occurred in the
Tenth Amendment case of New York v. United States."' Following Garcia's overruling of NationalLeague of Cities, dis-

an analysis of the precedents, he puts more weight on considerations of justice in
terms of limiting the power of Congress to create private federal causes of action
against a state, or its governor, for the violation of a federal right.
The arguments of the other dissenters, voiced by Justice Souter, are not instrumental in nature. Justice Souter relied on his interpretation of cases but even
more on history and general principles of constitutionalism, including the concept
that express provisions of the Constitution should not be trumped by "judicially
discoverable principles untethered to any written provision.' Id. at 1177. On this
last point, Justice Souter is unquestionably right. The natural law tradition of our
constitutional history rejects judges imposing natural law principles on constitutional decisionmaking that were not placed into the Constitution by the Framers
and Ratifiers. See id. at 1177-78; supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text, and
sources cited therein.
17 Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1149-52.
17 In Seminole Tribe, Justice Souter did not call for Hans to be completely
overruled. With regard to special factors that might call for Hans to be overruled,
Justice Souter noted that Hans had not proven unworkable in practice, did not
conflict with later doctrine, and that facts had not changed to undermine its premises. Id. at 1184. However, Justice Souter concluded that Hans was sufficiently
wrongly decided that, at least, Congress should be permitted 'to abrogate7 the
Hans principle if Congress so wished. Id. at 1159-60, 1184-85.
176505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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cussed above,' 77 it was unclear what role remained for the
Tenth Amendment as a matter of constitutional law. New York
revived the Tenth Amendment, to a limited extent.
From the perspective of this Article, the most important
observation is that Justice O'Connor did not call in New York
for Garcia to be overruled, despite having dissented in that
case.'78 Instead, Justice O'Connor seemed to be reconciled in
New York to the expansion of federal power allowed by a line
of cases which culminated in Garcia,particularly as those precedents were decided against a background of legislative and
executive action also supporting broad federal governmental
power. 79 However, Justice O'Connor noted in New York that
despite this expansion, any federal action that "commandeers"
a state legislative process was simply too wrong to stand as a
precedent. 8 '
The central question in New York was whether Congress,
consistent with the Tenth Amendment, could encourage states
to deal with low-level radioactive waste, by requiring them
either to accept ownership of waste generated within their
borders or to provide regulations according to instructions by
Congress.'' Justice O'Connor artfully distinguished Garcia
by noting that Garcia involved the authority of Congress to
subject state governments to generally applicable laws, i.e.,
situations where Congress sought to subject states to the same
legislation that applied to private parties. Here, however, Congress was seeking to use the states as implements of federal
17 See supra text accompanying notes 99-107.
17

See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985)

(Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., Rehnquist and O'Connor, JJ.).
179 See New York, 505 U.S. at 157:
The Federal Government undertakes activities today that would have
been unimaginable to the Framers in two senses; first, because the
Framers would not have conceived that any government would conduct
such activities; and second, because the Framers would not have believed
that the Federal Government, rather than the States, would assume such
responsibilities. Yet the powers conferred upon the Federal Government
by the Constitution were phrased in language broad enough to allow for
the expansion of the Federal Government's role.
On the role within the natural law approach of post-ratification legislative and
executive action creating a gloss on meaning to the Constitution, which in this
context would support a broad view of congressional power under the Constitution,
see Kelso, Styles, supra note 1, at 157-59.
'80505 U.S. at 177-78.
...Id. at 174-77.
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regulation by directing or coercing them to regulate in a particular field or in a particular way. "2 Justice O'Connor's opinion
pointed to statements in several cases, actions in the Constitutional Convention, and statements in The FederalistPapers
and the ratification campaign-all of which, in her judgment,
showed an intent by the Framers that Congress should have

power to regulate individuals, not states. These statements
were preceded by the quote from Hodel that "Congress may not
simply 'commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by
directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regula-

tory program.""8 To hold otherwise would not be merely
wrong, but substantially wrong. Thus, this aspect of the federal regulation involved in the case needed to be ruled unconstitutional."8
A fourth area of governmental structure where the postinstrumental Court has tinkered with instrumental doctrine
when it found such doctrine to be substantially in error in-

182 Id. at 178.
18 Id. at 176

(quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass"n,
Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)). Justice O'Connor also noted that in The Federalist
Papers, Hamilton spoke only about extending the authority of the federal government to citizens, "the only proper objects of government." The Constitutional Convention had rejected the New Jersey Plan for the reason, among others, that it
might require the federal government to coerce the states into implementing legislation. And during the ratification campaign there were a number of statements
that the laws of Congress will now be binding on individuals rather than on the
states. Justice O'Connor extracted from these sources a general Tenth Amendment
principle she thought the Framers had embodied into the structure of the Constitution regarding state autonomy as a value. Id. at 177-80.
'" Id. at 177-80. Justice White, dissenting with Justices Blackmun and Stevens,
questioned this mode of distinguishing Garcia. He pointed out that in no previous
case had the Court rested its holding on a distinction between a federal statute's
regulation of states and private parties for general purposes, as opposed to a regulation solely on the activities of states. Id. at 201 (White, J., dissenting). He continued:
An incursion on state sovereignty hardly seems more constitutionally
acceptable if the federal statute that =commands" specific action also
applies to private parties. The alleged diminution in state authority over
its own affairs is not any less because the federal mandate restricts the
activities of private parties.
Id. at 201-02. During the 1996 term, the Supreme Court will have occasion to
revisit the limits of the New York principle in Printz v. United States, 66 F.3d
1025 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S.Ct. 2521 (1996). Printz involves a challenge to the constitutionality of the Brady Bill's provisions requiring local law
enforcement officials to make "reasonable effortse to do the background checks required by the Brady Bill before a gun may be purchased.
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volves the power of Congress to enforce the Civil War
Amendments-Amendments Thirteen, Fourteen and Fifteen.
The instrumental era saw substantial changes in thirteenth amendment jurisprudence. These changes were based
mostly on the instrumental Court's perception that the prior
cases were wrongly decided from the perspective of instrumental social policy. For example, in 1968, the Court overruled
prior doctrine to hold in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 85 that
42 U.S.C. § 1982 bars all race discrimination, private as well
as public, in the sale or rental of property, and that it was
within Congress' power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment.'86 In 1971, the Court overruled prior doctrine in Griffin
v. Breckenridge,87 and held that Section 1985(3), an exercise
of power under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, extended validly to private conspiratorial violence based on "racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidious discriminatory
animus. " "' In 1976, the Court extended Jones in Runyon v.
McCrary to Section 1981 and the right to make contracts.189
The post-instrumental Court has not reversed or limited
this line of instrumental precedents. However, it also has not
used them to expand federal protections.' In part, this is
392 U.S. 409 (1968).
'" Dissenting in Jones, Justice Harlan stated that the statute's words suggested
a right to equal status under law and, thus, a right enforceable only against statesanctioned discrimination. Id. at 473-76 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
The Court in Jones also abandoned its apparently exclusive claim in the Civil
Rights Cases to define the "badges and incidents of slavery." The Court stated that
Congress has the power rationally to determine what are the badges and incidents
of slavery, limited only by the "necessary and proper" clause test of McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), and to translate its understanding into
effective legislation. Jones, 392 U.S. at 437-44.
18 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
1 Id. at 102.
18 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (a private school violates 42 U.S.C. § 1981 if it discriminates in admissions on the basis of race); see McDonald v. Santa Fe Transp., 427
U.S. 273 (1976) (race discrimination in employment violates 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
Proof of intent to discriminate, however, has continued to be required. General
Bldg. Contractors v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982).
190 In Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993), the
Court passed up a chance to apply or expand the Griffin concept of recovery for a
"class-based invidious discriminatory animus." Instead, the Court held that
§ 1985(3) did not provide a federal action for conspiracy to obstruct access to abortion clinics. The Court stated that the opposition to abortion was not "class-based
invidiously discriminatory animus" because it did not focus on women by reason of
their sex. Id. at 270-74. The Court did not decide whether § 1985(3) is limited to
1.
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because the Court does not view these results as substantially
wrong or unjust. For example, in 1989, the Court unanimously
reaffirmed Runyon v. McCrary." Justice Kennedy's opinion
stressed stare decisis, stating that the case had not been undermined by subsequent decisions or legislation, had not
proved unworkable, and did not frustrate the objectives of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' Focusing on whether
the case represented a substantially unjust result, Justice
Kennedy stated:
Whether Runyon's interpretation of Section 1981 as prohibiting ra-

cial discrimination in the malting and enforcement of private contracts is right or wrong as an original matter, it is certain that it is
not inconsistent with the prevailing sense of justice in this country.
To the contrary, Runyon is entirely consistent with our society's
deep commitment to the eradication of discrimination based on a
person's race or the color of his or her skin.en

The instrumental line of cases involving congressional
power under the Fourteenth amendment have been more vigorously questioned by the post-instrumental Court. In 1966,
the Court, per Justice Brennan, held in Katzenbach v. Morgan' 4 that laws enacted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment would be upheld so long as they met the "Necessary and Proper Clause" test of McCulloch v. Maryland."
The Court then applied that approach to uphold a provision in
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which abolished state literacy

cases involving racial animus. But there is no evidence that the present Court will
exceed that limit.
In addition, the Court has confined § 1981 and § 1982 to "raca discrimina-

tion and has not extended them to discrimination for national origin or religion.
Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987); Saint Francis College v.
A1-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987). The Court has held, however, that 'race" is not
limited by modern scientific understanding, so claims for racial discrimination can

be stated by an Arab or Jew under § 1981 and § 1982. The Court stated: "Congress intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes of persons who
are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or eth-

nic characteristics." Id. at 613.
191 Patterson
11

v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).

Id. at 173-74.

1
Id. at 174. The opinion went on to hold that while § 1981 bans discrimination in hiring and promotion, it does not apply to acts of racial harassment committed in connection with employment. Id. at 175-82. Thus, once again, the postinstrumental Court refused to expand federal remedies for discrimination.
384 U.S. 641 (1966).
'"
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
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tests for persons who had completed the sixth grade in a Puerto Rican school which instructed in other than english.0
Justice Brennan's opinion stated that it was enough that the
Court perceive a basis on which Congress could have concluded
that abolishing a literacy test in these circumstances would be
helpful in gaining nondiscriminatory treatment in public services or could have found that the literacy test was an invidious discrimination against Puerto Ricans.'97 The opinion thus
seemed to give Congress the power, when seeking to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment, to address conditions that the
Court would not consider to have been violations of the Constitution.'
The principle that Congress can determine for itself constitutional violations strikes at the very heart of Marbury v.
Madison, where the Court held that the Supreme Court is the
authoritative interpreter of the Constitution.'99 Thus, it appears substantially wrong. It is thus not surprising that the
Katzenbach v. Morgan theory of congressional power has been
cut back since the demise of the Warren Court instrumental
majority in 1969.200

.. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 652-58.
:9 Id. at 656.
198 Id.
at 657-58. Dissenting in Katzenbach, Justice Harlan stated that there
was no factual record by which Congress could have found that spanish-speaking
citizens are as capable of making informed decisions as english-speaking citizens,
and there was no legislative record supporting the Court's hypothesized possibility
of discrimination. Id. at 669 (Harlan, J., dissenting, joined by Stewart, J.). Thus,
the Court improperly allowed Congress to decide what was a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. If Congress had such a power, it might be used to dilute
equal protection and due process. Id. at 670-71. Justice Brennan replied that
Congress' power was limited to adopting measures that enforce the amendment.
Congress could not restrict or dilute its guarantees. Id. at 657-58.
On this last point, there seems to be little disagreement. As the Court, per
Justice O'Connor, stated in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718 (1982), § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress a broad power but
Congress' power is "limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the
Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these
guarantees . . . . Although we give deference to congressional decisions and classifications, neither Congress nor a State can validate a law that denies the rights
guaranteed by the 14th Amendment." Id. at 732-33 (quoting Morgan, 384 U.S. at
651 n.10).
* See generally TRIBE, supra note 32, at 342-50.
20 On the demise of the Warren Court majority in 1969, see supra text accompanying note 33.
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For example, in Oregon v. Mitchell,2 01 a 5-4 Court held
that Congress had no power to establish a minimum age of
eighteen for voters in state and local elections. Justice Stewart,
with Justices Burger and Blackmun, stated that they interpreted Katzenbach v. Morgan as approving a remedy for past
discriminatory treatment in public services or for the impermissible purpose of denying the right to vote to Puerto Ricans.
Justice Stewart did not read the case as giving Congress the
right to nullify a state law whenever Congress could rationally
conclude that the law was not supported by a compelling state
interest. He stated that Congress has power under the Fourteenth Amendment to "provide the means of eradicating situations that amount to a violation of [equal protection]," but not
to "determine as a matter of substantive constitutional law
that situations fall within the ambit of the clause." Justice
Harlan also repeated his view that only the Court has the authority to determine when states have exceeded constitutional
limits on their powers."' Concerning the stare decisis aspect
of Morgan, Justice Harlan noted his "deep conviction" that it
was wrongly decided, and also noted the evident malaise
among the other members of the Court with those decisions.'
Later cases have also limited Morgan. In 1981, Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Court in PennhurstState School v.

400 U.S. 112 (1970).
2'
Id. at 296.
20Id
at 152-54.
1 Id. at 217-18 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Black, providing the critical
fifth vote in the case, stated that the 18-year old vote provision was not related to
discrimination by race, and Congress had thus invaded an area reserved to the
states. Id. at 130 (Black, J., concurring).
Dissenting from the majority's conclusion on this point, Justice Brennan stated that Congress can make its own determination on questions of fact, and here
could have found that excluding citizens age 18 to 21 from voting was wholly
unnecessary to promote any legitimate interest in assuring intelligent and responsible voting. Id. at 278-81 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part,
joined by White and Marshall, JJ.). Justice Douglas also dissented from the
Court's conclusion that Congress could not prescribe that 18-year olds could vote
in state and local elections. Id. at 135 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
20'
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0 5 stated that because legislation enforcing the
Halderman,
Fourteenth Amendment intrudes on traditional state authority,
we should not quickly attribute to Congress an unstated intent to
act under its authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment ....
The case for inferring intent is at its weakest where, as here, the
rights asserted impose affirmative obligations on the States to fund
certain services, since we may assume that Congress will not implicitly attempt
to impose massive financial obligations on the
20 6
States.

Justice Rehnquist's remarks were strengthened by Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion in Gregory v. Ashcroft."7 She
wrote that in determining whether Congress has intended to
restrict state political functions, the Court, in accord with
Pennhurst,will apply a "plain statement" rule."'
The instrumental line of cases under the Fifteenth
Amendment are also under serious post-instrumental Court
scrutiny. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 created several devices
to remedy race discrimination in voting and to prevent its
2105

206
207

451 U.S. 1 (1981).
Id. at 16-17.
501 U.S. 452 (1991).

" Id. at 460-61. Justice O'Connor stated, "[We] will not attribute to Congress
[without a plain statement] an intent to intrude on state governmental functions
regardless of whether Congress acted pursuant to its commerce clause powers or
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 470.
In 1983, Justice Brennan had sought to cabin the interpretation theory of
Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor in his majority opinion in EEOC v. Wyoming,
460 U.S. 226 (1983). Justice Brennan stated that Congress need not recite the
words "section 5" or "14th Amendment" or "equal protection." The question is one
of discerning legislative purpose. Id. at 243 n.18. Chief Justice Burger dissented in
EEOC v. Wyoming with Justices Powell, O'Connor and Rehnquist.
In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger wrote that Congress can invalidate state
laws by using its power to enforce the Civil War Amendments, but only if Congress considers it necessary to remedy past constitutional violations (in the sense
of what the Court says are violations), or to guard against future violations. Id. at
259-63. He stated that Congress could not impose restrictions on the mandatory
retirement laws of the states where Congress did not find it necessary to guard
against encroachment of guaranteed rights or to rectify past discrimination. He
noted that there had been no finding that a state law infringed on rights identified by the Court. The Chief Justice also stated that "allowing Congress to protect
constitutional rights statutorily that it has independently defined fundamentally
alters our scheme of government." Id. at 262. In light of Gregory u. Ashcroft, it
seems likely that today's Court will adhere to these concepts since the views of
Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor are likely to be shared, at the least, by Justices
Scalia, Thomas and Kennedy.
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reoccurrence. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach,"' an instrumental Court upheld the law as appropriate under Section 2 of
the Fifteenth Amendment, including the law's ban on literacy
tests and a requirement that new voting rules need
preclearance and must lack both discriminatory purpose and
effect. In 1980, a 6-3 Court upheld application of preclearance
provisions and denied relief to a city which sought to create
several at-large districts although it had not, for at least seventeen years, engaged in voter discrimination.21 The majority opinion by Justice Marshall relied on Morgan by giving it a
broad but remedial interpretation.'
Recent Supreme Court cases dealing with redistricting
have cut back on this interpretation of the Fifteenth Amendment. As with the Fourteenth Amendment, where a majority of
the Justices have responded to fundamental separation of
powers concerns, the Court has reasserted its primary role in
determining constitutional violations. It now seems unwilling
to allow Congress, through the Voting Rights Act, to determine
the constitutional limits of discrimination or afirmative action
with respect to voting rights.12
383 U.S. 301, 326-37 (1966).
City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, rehg denied, 447 U.S. 916
(1980).
211 Justice Marshall, for the Court, stated that when exercising authority under
§ 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, as when acting under the Necessary and Proper
Clause, Congress can do whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions
they contain. Id. at 174-77. Thus, Congress may prohibit state action that, though
not itself a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment, perpetuates the effects of prior
discrimination in voting or, in jurisdictions that have intentionally discriminated,
creates a risk of purposeful discrimination in the future. Id. at 177-78.
Justice Powell, dissenting, stated that Congress could abridge the voting
rights of citizens only if remedying violations of voting rights. Since the City of
Rome had not violated any voting rights, Congress had no authority to continue
preclearance requirements until the entire state satisfied bailout standards. Id. at
196-205.
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting with Justice Stewart, would narrow Morgan
even further. Justice Rehnquist stated that Congress can act remedially only to
enforce judicially established substantive prohibitions. Id. at 209-11. Here, however,
the congressional bar to local action could not genuinely be characterized as a
remedial exercise of congressional enforcement powers because the proposed electoral changes, unlike literacy bans, do not have a disparate effect traceable to discrimination by government bodies. Id. at 211-15. Rehnquist added that in view of
Oregon v. Mitchell, Morgan should be construed as 'consonant with! a remedialonly view of the power that Congress has under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
at 220-21.
212 See generally Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996) (strict scrutiny applied to
20
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A fifth area of structural concerns where the modern Court
has been willing to cut back significantly on instrumental-era
precedents involves the law of taxpayer and citizen standing.
Regarding what facts are sufficient to give a party standing to
sue in the federal courts, and the extent of Congress' power to
legislate standing in situations where it would not otherwise
be found by the Court, the leading instrumental precedents
have been distinguished almost to the point of being overruled.
Prior to the 1960s, the plaintiff had to suffer a distinct
injury personal to him or her in order for the federal courts to
have constitutional authority to hear plaintiffs claim.213 During the instrumental years, however, beginning with Baker v.
Carr"4 in 1962, Justice Brennan stated for the Court that
earlier cases contained overgeneralized language and that
standing was merely a prudential matter.215 Six years later,
test constitutionality of racial gerrymandering); Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894
(1996) (same); Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995) (same); Shaw v. Reno,
509 U.S. 630 (1993) (same). The precise contours of current Supreme Court doctrine remain unclear, however, as only five Justices have consistently held that
use of race as a predominant factor in drawing congressional districts violates the
Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1941. Of these five, Justice
O'Connor appears to have left open some room for a congressional role in this
area. Id. at 1968 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I write separately to express my view
on two points. First, compliance with the results test of § 2 of the Voting Rights
Act (VRA) is a compelling state interest [that would satisfy the first element of a
strict scrutiny test]. Second, that test can co-exist in principle and in practice with
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), and its progeny, as elaborated in today's opinions.").
2- Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 (1944). Justice Reed there stated for the
Court:
It is only when a complainant possesses something more than a general
interest in the proper execution of the laws that he is in a position to
secure judicial intervention. His interest must rise to the dignity of an
interest personal to him and not possessed by people generally. Such a
claim is of that character which constitutionally permits adjudication by
courts under their general powers.
Id. at 304.
The need for injury was made even clearer in Doremus v. Board of Education,
342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952) ("Without disparaging the availability of the remedy by
taxpayer's action to restrain unconstitutional acts which result in direct pecuniary
injury, we reiterate what the Court said of a federal statute is equally true when
a state Act is assailed: 'The party who invokes the power must be able to show
not only that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in
danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not
merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.'")
(quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923)).
214

369 U.S. 186 (1962).

215 Justice Brennan stated: "Have the appellants alleged such a personal stake
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Chief Justice Warren cited this language with approval in
Flast v. Cohen,216 where the Court found standing for federal
taxpayers to raise an establishment clause challenge to government spending that reached some parochial schools."' Flast
thus suggested a wide expansion in the concept of standing.
Since the demise of the Warren Court instrumental majority in 1969, however, that has not been the impact of Fast as
a precedent. Instead, the desire by noninstrumental Justices to
preserve the separation of powers by enforcing traditional
limitations on standing has outweighed the instrumental policy
of seeking to accomplish justice by keeping the judicial system
open to any claimant who has a cause of action. In 1982, Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court in Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United"'8 that in order to obtain Article
III standing, the plaintiff must show that "he personally has
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
putatively illegal conduct of the defendant" and that the injury
"fairly can be traced to the challenged
action," and "is likely to
"2
decision.
favorable
a
by
be redressed

in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions? This is the gist of the question of
standing." Id. at 204.
2"6 392 U.S. 83 (1968).

217 Chief Justice Warren stated: "[1n terms of Article I
limitations on federal
court jurisdiction, the question of standing is related only to whether the dispute
sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a form
historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution." Id. at 101.
218 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
219 Id. at 472.
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While Congress has some role to play in enlarging standing by creating new causes of action, this role is limited.2
Thus, the requirement of personal injury continues. 22 ' However, the specific holding of Flast remains.2
A sixth area where serious concern about the correctness
of prior precedent has led the Court to overrule a case deals
with checks against official misconduct under the Due Process
Clause. In 1981, the Court held in Parrattv. Taylor22 3 that a
22 Justice Kennedy observed the following in a concurring opinion that provided
the controlling votes in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife:
In my view, Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate
chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where
none existed before, and I do not read the Court's opinion to suggest a
contrary view.. . . In exercising this power, however, Congress must at
the very least identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the
injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit.
504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, joined by Souter, J.). Justice
Scalia adopted an even stricter view of standing in Lujan. He stated that
there is absolutely no basis for making the Article III inquiry turn on
the source of the asserted right. Whether the courts were to act on their
own, or at the invitation of Congress, in ignoring the concrete injury
requirement described in our cases, they would be discarding a principle
fundamental to the separate and distinct constitutional role of the Third
Branch-one of the essential elements that identifies those "Cases" and
"Controversies" that are the business of the courts rather than of the
political branches.
Id. at 576 (Scalia, J.).
This subject will receive additional attention during the 1996 Term as the
Court granted certiorari in the case of Bennett v. Plenert, 63 F.3d 915 (9th Cir.
1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1316 (1996). That case presents the question of
whether the Endangered Species Act has effectively granted standing to persons
who challenge governmental compliance with mandated procedures because of their
economic interests, and who do not plead any interest in preserving endangered
species. Id.
"2 See United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995) (voters lack standing to
challenge an alleged racist gerrymander unless they personally have been subject
to race discrimination). However, in equal protection cases the denial of equal
treatment imposed by a barrier to a benefit is the injury in fact. Northeastern
Florida Chapter of Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993) (it
was not necessary that plaintiffs allege or prove that they would have been
awarded contracts but for the challenged affirmative action program).
m As a matter of settled law, it is still true that standing exists for litigants
relying, as taxpayers, on the Establishment Clause to curb federal spending programs. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in Bowen v. Kendrick, 487
U.S. 589, 618 (1988), stated, "We have consistently adhered to Flast and the narrow exception it created to the general rule against taxpayer standing established
in Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923)." For an in-depth discussion of the
law of standing, organized according to the natural law, formalist, Holmesian, instrumental and post-instrumental periods, see KELSO & KELSO, supra note 1.

223

451 U.S. 527, 543 (1981), overruled in part, 474 U.S. 344 (1986) (the Court
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loss negligently caused by a state official was an actionable
deprivation within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.
Five years later, at the beginning of the post-instrumental era,
the Court held in Daniels v. Williams"4 that the word "deprive" in the Due Process Clause connotes more than a negligent act. It proceeded to overrule Parrattto the extent it said
that lack of due care by a state official may "deprive" an individual of life, liberty, or property under the Fourteenth Amendment.2
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in Daniels,
gave two main reasons for concluding that Parrattwas substantially wrong. First, he stated that historically the guarantee of due process was applied to deliberate decisions of government officials.' 5 No case before Parratt had held otherwise. He stated that this reflects the fact that the Due Process
Clause, like the Magna Carta, was intended to secure individuals from the arbitrary power of government-from the use of
power for oppression.' In contrast, lack of due care "suggests no more than a failure to measure up to the conduct of a
Second, although the Constitution
reasonable person."'
deals with large concerns of governors and governed, it does
not purport to supplant traditional tort law in laying down
rules of conduct to regulate liability for injuries that occur by
living together in society, which includes lack of due care by
prison officials. Chief Justice Rehnquist cited two cases to
analogize this point: (1) Estelle v. Gamble,' where it was
stated that "medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner"; and
2
which stated the same about false
(2) Baker v. McCollan,'
imprisonment due to state action."1
held that the state's post-deprivation tort remedy provided the process that was
due).
2' 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986) (prisoner injured by falling on a prison stairway
due to official negligence in leaving a pillow there).
Id. at 331-32.
6 Id.
22 Id.
22 Id. at 332. The Court added, "To hold that injury caused by such conduct is
a deprivation within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment would trivialize
the centuries-old principle of due process of law." Id.
22 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977).
"'

443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979).

21

Daniels, 474 U.S. at 333. In a companion case, Davidsoa v. Cannon, 474
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e. The Precedent Raises Concerns About the Rule of Law
The last "special reason" to overrule a precedent includes a
number of loosely related principles, all deeply rooted in the
traditional common-law method of decisionmaking. We discuss
four of these principles here to help provide some content to
the concern about "the rule of law."
First, today's post-instrumental Court has disagreed with
the holdings of several instrumental precedents relating to
whether newly announced rules of constitutional law should be
applied to all pending cases or only prospectively to conduct in
the future. The theory of judicial review from the original natural law period through the formalist and Holmesian eras was,
as stated in Marbury v. Madison, 2 that it is the "duty of the
judicial department to say what that law is."23 That principle has been taken to imply that any rule of law stated in a
case, even a newly discovered rule, should be applied not only
in the future, but also to conduct and cases that preceded the
decision-at least all cases not fully resolved.234
Despite this long tradition, in 1965 an instrumentally
oriented Supreme Court treated the matter as one of policy
and held in Linkletter v. Walker 5 that the Constitution nei-

U.S. 344, 345-48 (1986), the Court held that there was no deprivation where prison officials forgot a prisoner's note reporting a threat from another prisoner, who
later assaulted the writer. The instrumental Justices wanted the rule on deprivation to be more protective of individual rights. Id. at 349-50. Justice Brennan, dissenting, would find a deprivation if official conduct that causes personal injury is
due to recklessness or deliberate indifference. He thought that issue should be
remanded for review. Id. at 349. Justice Blackmun, dissenting with Justice Marshall, stated that governmental negligence is an abuse of power and a deprivation
where a state assumes sole responsibility for physical security and then ignores a
call for help. Id. at 349-50. Justice Stevens, concurring in both cases, stated that
"deprivation" identifies the victim's loss, not the actor's state of mind, but the
state had provided adequate procedures. Id. at 340-41.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
" Id. at 177.
2s" This rule was based on the belief "that the duty of the court was not to
'pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one.' Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622-23 (1965) (citing 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 69
(15th ed. 1809)). Before the instrumental era the common law and the Court had
recognized "a general rule of retrospective effect for the constitutional decisions of
[the] Court . . . subject to [certain] limited exceptions." Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S.
505, 507, reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
23' Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629.
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ther prohibits nor requires retrospective effect. Exercising its
newly discovered freedom, the Court decided that newly imposed constitutional rules regarding criminal procedure should
be applied only prospectively when criminal proceedings were
challenged in a collateral review." s This precedent was extended in 1969, when the Court held in Desist v. United
States 7 that it would not apply new constitutional criminal
rules to events that preceded the decision, even in cases on
direct appeal. Commenting on Desist two years later in Mackey
v. United States, Justice Harlan stated: "T]he Court's assertion of power to disregard current law in adjudicating cases before us that have not already run the full course of appellate
review, is quite simply an assertion that our constitutional
function is not one of adjudication but in effect of legislation."'
Despite Justice Harlan's concerns, the Desist approach was
extended to civil cases in 1971, when the Court decided Chevron Oil v. Hudson. 9 It there held that whether a new principle of law should be applied only prospectively depends on
whether retrospective operation would further or retard the
purpose of the rule, and whether retrospective application
would produce substantially inequitable results."0
The post-instrumental Court, on the other hand, has echoed Justice Harlan's dissents in Desist and Mackey. Reverting
to traditional theory, the Court reversed Desist and Chevron
Oil in Griffith v. Kentucky.2"' Decided in 1987, Griffith held
that all new rules for criminal prosecutions would be applied
to all cases on direct review, with no exceptions. The Court's
opinion said that the integrity of judicial review requires the

Id. at 629-40. The Court later elaborated upon Linldetter to hold that the
"criteria guiding resolution of the question implicate (a) the purpose to be served
by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enlorcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a
retroactive application of the new standards.' Stovall v. Deano, 388 U.S. 293, 297
(1967).
' 394 U.S. 244, reh g denied, 395 U.S. 931 (1969).
2m 401 U.S. 667, 679 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
29404

21 Id.
241

U.S. 97 (1971).

at 105-09.

479 U.S. 314 (1987).
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Court, after declaring a new rule in adjudicating a specific
case, "to apply that rule to all similar cases pending on direct
review. ",242
The Griffith holding was extended in Harper v. Virginia
Department of Taxation, 3 decided in 1993. There, the Court
stated: "Our approach to retroactivity heeds the admonition
that "It]he Court has no more constitutional authority in civil
cases than in criminal cases to disregard current law or to
treat similarly situated litigants differently."'
This extension of Griffith was locked solidly into place
when in Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 5 the Court summarized Harperas holding:
[W]hen (1) the Court decides a case and applies the (new) legal rule
of that case to the parties before it, then (2) it and other courts must
treat the same (new) legal rule as "retroactive," applying it, for example, to all pending cases, whether or not those cases involve
predecision events.24

Another affront to the rule of law would occur if the
Court's decision in a case were perceived as not based upon
proper legal argumentation, but as a response to political pressure. This reason was explicitly used in the joint opinion in
Casey as one reason for not overruling Roe v. Wade. 4 The
joint opinion in Casey stated:
The Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow people to accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims for them, as
grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social and
political pressures having, as such, no bearing on the principled
choices that the Court is obliged to make.'"

Taking a slightly different stance regarding this issue, but
acknowledging how important it is that the Court not be perceived as giving in to political pressure, Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted in Casey that the Court in West Coast Hotel v.

242
21
2"

Id. at 323.
509 U.S. 86 (1993).
Id. at 97 (quoting American Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 214

(1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
245
20

115 S.Ct. 1745 (1995).
Id. at 1748.

247 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865-69
(1992).
248

Id. at 865-66.
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Parrish"9 and Brown v. Board of Education" had acknowledged and corrected its previous errors in Lochner and Plessy,
even though there was great pressure to overrule those cases."' Further, public protests should not alter the normal application of stare decisis, "lest perfectly lawful protest activity
be penalized by the Court itself."- 2 Chief Justice Rehnquist
also stated that the Court should never make its decisions with
a view toward speculative public perceptions. Rather, the
Court's legitimacy is enhanced by faithful interpretation of the
Justice Scalia agreed with Chief Justice
Constitution.'
Rehnquist, but found the joint opinion even more unsatisfactory. He stated he was "appalled" by the Court's suggestion that
the decision whether to overrule an erroneous constitutional
decision must be strongly influenced against overruling by the
substantial and continuous public opposition it has generated.'
A third concern about the rule of law is whether the original precedent was decided only after full briefing and argument on the issue, or without the benefit of brief and argumentation. For example, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.
v. City of Hialeah,' Justice Souter noted that Justice
Scalia's conclusions in Employment Division v. Smith,"
which altered the free exercise clause doctrine, were not the
product of full briefing and argument on the issue of changing
standards in free exercise clause cases.' Thus, Justice
Souter indicated in Hialeah less reluctance to overrule Smith
since it did not have the imprimatur of consideration after full
briefing and argument.'

300 U.S. 379 (1937).

222
23

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 960.

Id.
Id. at 959-60 (ebnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
~'Id. at 998-1001 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
2

494 U.S. 872 (1990).

- Hialeah, 113 S.Ct at 2247 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
IsId. ("[A] constitutional principle announced sua sponte is entitled to less deference than one addressed on full briefing and argument.7).
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A fourth consideration regarding concerns about the rule
of law is whether the reasoning in a precedent commanded the
support of five or more members of the Supreme Court, or
whether it was only a plurality opinion. Naturally, a plurality
opinion is entitled to less weight than a majority opinion.59
If the majority opinion is accompanied by one or more concurrences, that can also weaken a precedent's force, particularly if
the concurrences suggest different rationales.260 Indeed, occasionally members of the Court have implicitly seemed to state
that a precedent that is the product of a 5-4 vote, with the four
in dissent vigorously contesting the rightness of the majority
opinion, may be entitled to less weight than a 6-3, 7-2, 8-1 or
9-0 case.26'
III. STYLE-RELATED TECHNIQUES
EXTENDING PRECEDENTS

FOR

FOLLOWING

OR

The most common result when a court considers a factually analogous precedent is that the court follows the precedent
without extending it. Of course, every new fact situation to
which a rule is applied is in some sense an extension of the
rule.262 However, in common usage, if the facts in the new
case are closely analogous to the facts of a prior case, normal
legal terminology states that the precedent has been followed,
not extended.

"' See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1127 (1996) (noting that Justice Brennan's opinion in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1,
5 (1989), overruled, Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1118, was a four-justice plurality, and thus entitled to lesser precedential weight than if it had been a majority
opinion).
26" See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952),
where Justice Black's more formalist opinion for the Court on the extent of presidential power, id. at 587-88, was substantially undercut by the more functional
understanding of presidential power adopted in concurring opinions. Id. at 610-14
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
261 See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 559-60
(1985) (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., Rehnquist and O'Connor, JJ.)
(questioning the vitality of Garcia's overruling of National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), as a precedent); id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(same); id. at 589 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (same).
292

See EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 2-3 (1949)

(discussing how rules change as they are applied in new fact situations).
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If the facts of a current case are perceived to be only somewhat similar to those of a precedent, however, instead of being
closely analogous, then "following" the precedent may really be
"extending" it, at least slightly. This way of treating a precedent involves building on a precedent with which the judge
agrees.
A second way to "follow or extend" a precedent involves
targeting an aspect of the prior precedent with which the judge
agrees, and then emphasizing that part of the precedent. This
can occur when the later court focuses on some aspect of the
reasoning in the prior opinion, and resolves the case according
to that aspect without considering other things that the prior
court said in its opinion.
A third way to "follow or extend" a precedent is to elevate
some general statement, that may have been dictum, into the
status of a holding, or to find implicit in the precedent a broader principle than anything stated in the case, and use it as a
premise in the case at hand. When a court does this, the court
is really manipulating the prior precedent to claim that today's
court is merely following or extending prior law.
In a number of its constitutional law cases, the post-instrumental Court has followed or extended instrumental-era
precedents using one of the above techniques. This has most
frequently occurred when the instrumental-era precedent dealt
with a structural issue in a manner consistent with perspectives generated by formalist, Holmesian or natural law styles
of decisionmaldng. Some examples follow.
A. Building on Precedents
One example of building on a welcome precedent occurred
in 1995 as part of the term limits case. In 1969, the Court held
in Powell v. McCormack that Congress has no power to exclude
by a simple majority vote any person, duly elected by constituents, who is qualified for membership in accordance with the
text of the Constitution.2 " In 1995, the Court extended

2'3

395 U.S. 486, 550 (1969). Of course, Congress may expel a member from

Congress by a two-thirds vote. Id. at 506-07. The vote to exclude Representative

Powell, however, was not taken pursuant to this clause of the Constitution. Id. at
507-12.
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Powell to the states by holding in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton26 that states, like Congress, lack the power to add
to the qualifications of age, citizenship and residency that are
prescribed for members of Congress by the Constitution. Justice Stevens's opinion, for the majority (comprised of himself
and Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy and Souter), found
that the qualifications in the Constitution are fixed and exclusive.26 Justice Stevens cited Justice Story, who stated in his
treatise on the Constitution that "the [S]tates can exercise no
powers whatsoever, which exclusively spring out of the existence of the national government, which the constitution does
not delegate to them .... No [sitate can say, that it has reserved, what it never possessed."2" Justice Stevens added
that recognizing a power in the states to add qualifications
would violate a fundamental principle of representative democracy, that the people should choose whom they please to govern them. In support, he also cited to McCulloch v. Maryland,
wherein Justice Marshall stated that the government of the
Union is a government that emanates from the people.267

24
21

115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
Id. at 1848-54, 1856-60. Justice Stevens also noted that congressional and

state practice since the Constitution was ratified also support this view. Id. at
1861-66. On such later legislative and executive action being an appropriate source
of constitutional adjudication, possibly creating a "gloss" on meaning to the Constitution, see Kelso, Styles, supra note 1, at 140-42.
" U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1854 (quoting 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 627 (1833)).

" Id. (citing 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 430-36 (1819)). Justice Kennedy, concurring, elaborated on this theme, stating that there
can be no doubt, if we are to respect the republican origins of the Nation

and preserve its federal character, that there exists a federal right of
citizenship, a relationship between the people of the Nation and their
National Government, with which the States may not interfere.
Id. at 1875. Justice Thomas dissented, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-

tices O'Connor and -Scalia. Justice Thomas argued that where the Constitution is
silent about the exercise of a particular power, the federal government lacks that
power and the states enjoy it. Id. Justice Thomas stated the ultimate source of

constitutional authority is the consent of the people of each individual state, not
the consent of the undifferentiated people of the nation as a whole. Id. With re-

spect to reserved state powers, McCulloch did not indicate that the question depended on whether the states had enjoyed the power before the framing. Id. at
1879-80.
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A second example of building on welcome precedents involves abstention doctrine. The Anti-Injunction Act
bars
federal courts from enjoining most proceedings in state courts.
There are several exceptions to this ban, including express
authorization by Congress. Suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the
primary vehicle to enjoin enforcement of unconstitutional state
actions, were held in 1972 to be expressly authorized exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act.' However, the Court later
held in Younger v. Harris," that because of respect for "Our
Federalism," the federal courts, as a matter of comity, should
not enjoin a state criminal action if prosecution was begun
before proceedings of substance on the merits had occurred in
the federal action. Younger was extended in 1977 by Juidice v.
Vail,2 71 where the Court required abstention from adjudicating a challenge to a state's contempt process in an on-going
state action, because the Court perceived that maintaining its
judicial system was a sufficiently great interest for the state.
In 1987, the Court extended Younger to civil actions in
Pennzoil v. Texaco, Inc. 2 It was there held that a federal
court may not enjoin a plaintiff who has prevailed in a state
trial court from executing the judgment in plaintiffs favor
pending an appeal to a state appellate court. Justice Powell,
with Justices Rehnquist, White, Scalia and O'Connor, said that
a state has an important interest in the enforcement of its
orders and judgments in its courts.'

28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1958).
270

Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).

27

430 U.S. 327, 335-39 (1977).

22

481 U.S. 1 (1987).
'"Id. at 13-14. Justices Brennan and Marshall disagreed with this conclusion,
and argued that Younger should, in general, not apply to civil proceedings, espe-

cially when plaintiff brings a § 1983 action. Id. at 19 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ.,
concurring in the judgment). The opinion went on to interpret the majority opinion

as based on all of the unique factual circumstances of the case, including the
"open courts" provision of the Texas Constitution. rd. at 21 n.e.

1034

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62: 973

B. Emphasizing Aspects of a Precedent with Which the Judge
Agrees
A good example of the technique of emphasizing only that
part of the prior precedent with which one agrees occurred in a
recent political question case, Nixon v. United States. 4 In
Nixon, the Court unanimously held that a challenge to the
Senate's vote in the trial of an impeachment case where the
Senate had acted on the basis of a report from a special Senate
Committee, together with a transcript of its proceedings was a
nonjusticiable political question. The proceedings were challenged as violating the Impeachment Trial Clause, Article I,
Section 3, Clause 6, stating that the "Senate shall have the
sole power to try all Impeachments."2 7 Citing language from
276 Justice
Baker v. Carr,
Rehnquist noted that use of the
word "sole" suggests that the Senate alone was intended to
determine whether an individual should be acquitted or convicted. 2" He also noted that historical sources supported this
conclusion."' In addition, Justice Rehnquist said that the
word "try" lacks sufficient precision to afford any judicially
manageable standard. The opinion was very much in accord
with the formalist and Holmesian tendency to prefer certain
and predictable doctrine, and to focus on constitutional text
and historical intent. It did not, however, fully embrace the
broad six-factor balancing approach of Justice Brennan's Baker
v. Carr opinion despite the fact that it purportedly relied on
Baker."9

274

113 S. Ct. 732 (1993).

275 Id. at 735 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
276 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. These factors are whether there is: a textually de-

monstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
an initial policy decision of a nonjudicial kind; need for respect to a decision already made; or a need for finality; or avoidance of embarrassment.
' Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 735-37.
2'8Id.

at 737-38.

2'9Id. at 739-40 (only cursory treatment given by Chief Justice Rehnquist to
Baker v. Carr's other factors). Justice White, joined by Justice Blackmun, concurred. To him, arguments based upon text and a lack of judicially manageable
standards were unpersuasive. Id. at 741-43, 745-46. Instead, engaging in a broader
inquiry, Justice White concluded that the historical evidence suggests a deep concern of the Framers with a basic system of checks and balances underlying the
separation of powers. A balance is achieved by having the Senate control the oth-
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C. Manipulating a Precedent to Claim It Is Merely Being
Followed
Judges usually make an effort, where it can logically be
done, to show that current decisions either follow from prior
decisions or are not inconsistent with prior decisions. Instrumental Justices are particularly creative in interpreting and
grouping precedents in order to show that they support, or at
least are not inconsistent with, a result believed just in a par-

ticular case.' 0
This tactic, however, is not reserved exclusively for instrumental Justices. For example, Holmesian Justice Rehnquist
applied the skill in Paul v. Davis"' and Posadas de Puerto
erwise largely unaccountable judiciary, with judicial review ensuring that the Senate adheres to a minimal set of procedural standards in conducting impeachment
trials. Id. at 743-45.
Justice Souter, tracing the political question doctrine back to the separation of
powers, thought that unusual circumstances, such as a coin-toss by the Senate,
might make judicial interference appropriate even though prudential concerns
would ordinarily counsel silence. Id. at 747-48.
' One example is Justice Brenan's opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 682 (1973), which stated that the Court, when engaging in equal protection review, could find "implicit support" for applying strict scrutiny to gender
classifications in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), even though Chief Justice
Burger explicitly stated in that case that the question was "whether a difference
in the sex of competing applicants for letters of administration bears a rational
relationship to a state objective ... ." See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct.
2264, 2275 (1996) (Justice Ginsburg perhaps manipulating precedents to increase
scrutiny in gender discrimination cases from 'intermediate scrutiny" to a new
"exceeding persuasive" standard of review); id. at 2288 (Rehnquist, J., concurring)
(criticizing the majority opinion for simultaneously using "intermediate scrutiny"
and "exceedingly persuasive" language); id. at 2294-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(same).
Another example of this type of reasoning is Justice Douglas's opinion in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, Justice Douglas found a
general right of privacy in the "penumbras of several specific guarantees of the
Bill of Rights. For trenchant criticism of this aspect of Justice Douglas's methodology in Griswold, see David Crump, How Do the Courts Really Discouer
Unenumerated Fundamental Rights? Cataloguing the Methods of JudicialAlchemy,
19 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY 795, 844-48 (1996).
2" 424 U.S. 693 (1976). In Paul, Justice Rehnquist creatively interpreted prior
precedents to find that there is no reputational interest under the liberty component of the fourteenth amendment procedural due process analysis. See generally
TRIBE, supra note 32, at 701-02; Note, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV.
L. REv. 56, 86-88, 92-95 (1976). For an article praising Justice Rehnquists opinion
in Paul for its "brilliant contemporary example of narrative prose in the service of
the adjudicator's unspoken desires," see Richard Weisberg, How Judges SpEaP:
Some Lessons on Adjudication in Billy Budd, Sailor* With an Application to Jus.
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though

Posadas recently was overruled.2" Formalist Justice Scalia
applied the skill in Employment Division v. Smith, by reinterpreting prior free exercise cases to require the combination of a
free exercise claim with another fundamental right in order to
trigger strict scrutiny.' Of course, the practical impact of
Smith has been limited by Congress.'

tice Rehnquist, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 42-58 (1982).
Pasados de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986), over.ruled by 44 Liquor Mart v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996); see generally
Donald E. Lively, The Supreme Court and Commercial Speech: New Words with an
Old Message, 72 MINN. L. REV. 289, 299-304 (1987) (discussing Justice Rehnquist's
attempts to "water-down" commercial speech doctrine in Posadas and other commercial speech cases).
See supra text accompanying notes 130-134.
28 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990).
Congress has limited Smith by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (Supp. 1993), which was signed by
President Clinton. The Act provides in part:
Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only
if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
If this law is viewed as an attempt by Congress to tell the Court hmv to decide a
question of constitutional law relating to the First Amendment, it seems likely
that the Court would hold the law unconstitutional as violating the independence
of the judiciary and the separation of powers. But see EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of
Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (rejecting the view that RFRA violates separation of powers). If it can be viewed as a self-imposed restraint on the exercise of
executive or administrative power by the federal government, it would have a good
chance of being sustained as an exercise of power under the Necessary and Proper
Clause. If interpreted as applicable to the states, as appears to be intended, the
best bet for constitutional authority would be the Commerce Clause, with the view
that the regulation involves something which has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. At least one federal court has sustained the constitutionality of the Act
on these grounds. See id. Using § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment might be questionable as Congress would be attempting to remedy a situation the Court has not
found to be unconstitutional. But see Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352, 1364
(5th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 65 U.S.L.W. 3017 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1996) (upholding the
RFRA as a valid exercise of congressional power under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment). In addition, the actual constitutional doctrine in Smith may soon be
overruled by the Supreme Court. See generally Kelso, Styles, supra note 1, at 184.
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CONCLUSION

In this Article, we have described the four styles of
decisionmaking and the views on precedent that fit most comfortably with each style-particularly the restraints on departing from precedent characteristic of the formalist, Holmesian
and natural law styles. We then discussed a number of cases
in which the post-instrumental Court has overruled or limited
instrumental-era precedents or, on the other hand, followed or
extended them.
As stated at the beginning of this Article, one might expect
today's post-instrumentalist Court to engage in a wholesale
overruling or limiting of instrumental-era precedents. After all,
these precedents resolved constitutional issues in ways unlikely to garner support by a majority of today's Justices. However,
as this Article has demonstrated, the current post-instrumental Court typically overrules or limits instrumental precedents
only when a showing can be made that the instrumental precedents are: (1) unworkable in practice; (2) inconsistent with
related constitutional doctrines; (3) based on false factual assumptions; (4) inconsistent with a commitment to the rule of
law; or (5) substantially wrong. As for this last factor, the
Court has reserved a finding of "substantial error" almost
exclusively for cases involving structural issues of separation of
powers, federalism, checks and balances or judicial review.
One practical consequence of this analysis is that those
who would advocate before the Court that an instrumentalist
precedent on a nonstructural issue should be overruled or
limited should do more than contend that the precedent was
wrongly decided. Reference should also be made to one or more
of the additional "special reasons" for overruling precedent as
discussed in this Article.
Returning to legal theory, we conclude with the thought
that the current Supreme Court's reluctance to overrule a
precedent, absent some special factor beyond a perception that
the case was wrongly decided, is an appropriate stance for a
modern natural law Court to take. This hesitance makes sense
from a theoretical standpoint, given the respect traditionally
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Accorded by natural law jurists to prior judicial work product,
reasoned elaboration of the law, and lawmaking as largely in
the province of the legislative branch.2 86

'

See generally Kelso & Kelso, Nine Tribunes, supra note 1, at 1310-13, 1321-

